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My dissertation weaves together the fields of agricultural conservation, regional devel-
opment, and public policy to investigate a sustainable and resilient system. In the first
chapter, I investigate the e↵ect of hydraulic fracturing on agricultural productivity in
Kern County, California, which is the state’s leading agricultural as well as unconventional
oil/gas mining county. To understand whether the (under-regulated) discharge of wastew-
ater from fracking activities generates any measurable negative externalities on agricul-
tural production, I conducted an event study analysis using di↵erence-in-di↵erences and
an extensive set of controls to quantify the impact of hydraulic fracturing activities on
the yield of major crops grown in Kern County. I found negative, statistically significant
e↵ects for multiple major crops in California, which confirms the farmers’ claim that the
fracking boom in the region has hurt crop yield and production. In the next chapter,
I studied the preferential tax assessment on agricultural land that are adopted in many
states to protect agricultural land from urban development. This study examines the
e↵ect of GreenBelt designation in Utah under Farmland Assessment Act on protecting
agricultural land from urban development. I found GreenBelt designation helped to pro-
tect peri-urban farmland from development, despite there is accusation of abuse. I show
empirical evidence that the GreenBelt designated agricultural parcels of larger size en-
courage urban conversion which contrasts to the goal of the program. From the results,
there are two major underlining policy implications. First, the program protects peri-
iv
urban farming at about 1.3% per designated parcel. Second, allowing for non-primary
agricultural use and the low enrollment rate of the program poses concerns on the e↵ec-
tiveness of the program. In the final chapter, I investigate the unintended consequences
of COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place (SP) on air quality in the United States on a county and
weekly scale. A comprehensive database of COVID-19 policies and air quality measures
is being complied for counties in all 50 states. According to the findings of this study,
having a Shelter-in-Place order increased the likelihood of having a good air day by 1.012
percent when accounting for both seasonality in air quality in the unobserved and the en-
dogeneity of the SP order. The results are consistent across di↵erent air quality measures
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My dissertation integrating theory and practice into fostering sustainable, ecofriendly,
and equitable public policy that promote the well-being of generations to come. My main
research questions are: how can we transform the complex socioeconomic systems to build
future resilience? In the first chapter, I identify and quantify the e↵ect of the presence of
tight oil and gas extraction on the agricultural productivity. This study informs evidence-
based policymaking on pressing environmental issues. In the next chapter, I studied the
e↵ectiveness of existing policy of urban growth control from an evolutionary landscape
and found that the decades-old regulation does not fulfill its goal. I worked on long-term,
high-resolution spatial-temporal satellite data from multiple sources to make the policy
assessment achievable and accessible. This research design, instrumental in explaining
the choice of the program enrollment, provides strong grounds for policy realignment
that benefits the regional economies and promotes agricultural sustainability. In the final
chapter, I evaluate the unintended e↵ect of Shelter-in-Place order for COVID-19 in the
United States while accounting for unobserved seasonality and the potential endogeneity
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Human activities and interventions had a profoundly impact on the environment. While
the full extent of long-term consequences can be uncertain, some consequences are already
being observed. The research presented in this dissertation is motivated by understanding
human activities, public policy, and the interaction of the two using causal influence
analysis in the quasi-experimental settings. With the high-quality, -dimensional, and
-frequency data become more accessible and available, the policy assessments in this
dissertation was made achievable by incorporating the use of these satellite data products.
The first research chapter investigates the linkage of technological advancements in
directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing and the induced decline in agricultural pro-
duction. Kern County, California is the one of the leading counties in the US in both
agricultural production and oil/gas extraction (California Department of Food and Agri-
culture, 2019; California Department of Conservation, 2020), which provides an oppor-
tunity to quantify the causal e↵ect of hydraulic fracturing on agricultural productivity.
A flurry of news reports document the onset of agricultural productivities decline due to
nearby drilling events, which marks the intervention period. The empirical strategy is
based on a di↵erence-in-di↵erences-style event study that exploits variation in crop yield
in Kern County and other California counties without fracking activities in the pre- and
post- intervention period. This chapter shed light to the energy policy and agricultural
literature by leveraging both cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in crop-yield to
analyze the dynamic e↵ects of hydraulic fracturing on individual crop productivity.
The next chapter evaluates a tax preferential program that have been implemented
for more than half a century (Utah State Legislature, 1987). All 50 states in the US
have some form of tax preferential program for agricultural land so that peri-urban farm-
ing would not be economically prohibitive. There are several di↵erent programs at the
national and state level in preserving agricultural land; prior research mostly focused
on the “purchase of development right” (PDR) program which is a national agricultural
preservation program. The attention on the state-level preferential assessment program
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is surprisingly thin. This study looks at Salt Lake County, Utah as a case study as the
rapid growth of population and employment in the recent decade o↵ers an opportunity
to study the e↵ectiveness of such state-level tax relief policy. This study utilizes the
long-term, high-resolution spatial-temporal satellite data from multiple sources to make
the parcel-level analysis feasible. There are important underlying policy implications in
the findings of this study. The preferential tax program has an overall positive e↵ect in
preserving agricultural land. However, this positive e↵ect is found only on parcels that
are less than five agricultural acres. As for parcels that are larger than five agricultural
acres, the program actually incentives farmland conversion. That can in turn negatively
impact the cost e↵ectiveness of the program as such e↵ect is contradictory to the goal of
the program and shifts the tax burden from agricultural landowners to urban landowners.
The final chapter explores the repercussion of the Shelter-in-Place order, which was in
e↵ect in the majority of counties and states across the United States during the COVID-
19 pandemic. Most existing literature focuses on the negative externalities of various
COVID-19 policies and their consequences; however, this chapter evaluates COVID-19
from a di↵erent perspective by exploring the potential positive externality. As human
activities are the primary source of air pollution; it is expected that the Shelter-in-
Place order will result in improved air quality. This study employs the AQI, which is
simple index used by the EPA to communicate with the public. Then, I constructed the
percentage of AQI that falls into the highest level of air quality, so that the measurable
e↵ect are not averaged out and still possess the easy-to-understand quality. This study
further controls for an extensive set of COVID-19 policies implemented at the county
and/or state levels, as well as the endogeneity associated with the Shelter-in-place order,
by employing the instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares regression. Finally,
I investigate not only the e↵ect when the Shelter-in-Place order in place, but also the
e↵ect after the order is lifted. This paper finds evidence that the Shelter-in-Place order




“Shaling” the Food Away: Evidence from Kern County, California
2.1 Abstract
In this study, we investigate the e↵ect of hydraulic fracturing on agricultural produc-
tivity in Kern County, California, which is the state’s leading agricultural as well as
unconventional oil/gas mining county. The Central Valley farmers, particularly in Kern
County, have reportedly noticed sudden crop deaths and decline in their agricultural
production since around 2009 that the local farmers have vehemently attributed to the
pollution of irrigation water as a result of the nearby fracking activities. To understand
whether the (under-regulated) discharge of wastewater from fracking activities generates
any measurable negative externalities on agricultural production, we conduct an event
study analysis using di↵erence-in-di↵erences with two-way fixed e↵ects and a rich set of
controls to quantify the impact of hydraulic fracturing activities on the yield of major
crops grown in Kern County. We find negative, statistically significant e↵ects for multiple
crops, which confirms the farmers’ claim that the fracking boom in the region has hurt
crop yield and production. We also find that certain crops show no e↵ect, which may be
suggestive of crop resilience to fracking-related externalities.
2.2 Introduction
Technological advancements in directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing have greatly
expanded access to rock formations, leading to the “Shale Revolution” in the last decade
across the United States.1 Hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as fracking, is a water-
intensive technique to extract oil and natural gas from shale formation. Shale resources
account for about 30 percent of U.S. production of liquid fuels, which include crude
oil, biofuels, and natural gas liquids, and 40 percent of U.S. production of natural gas
(Congressional Budget O ce, 2014). Fracking has enabled the United States to increase
its production of oil and natural gas, thus lessening its reliance on oil imports, and led
to improvements in a wide set of economic indicators (Weber, 2012; Feyrer et al., 2017;
Newell and Raimi, 2018; Bartik et al., 2019; Jacobsen, 2019).2 However, the practice has
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also been associated with a range of well-documented negative externalities, including
air pollution (Litovitz et al., 2013; Witter et al., 2014), water contamination (Osborn
et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2013; Olmstead et al., 2013; Vidic et al., 2013; Hill and Ma,
2017), soil sodification (Kondash et al., 2020), ecosystem disturbance (Allred et al., 2015;
McClung and Moran, 2018), heightened seismic activities (Ellsworth, 2013; Metz et al.,
2017; Ferreira et al., 2018), reduced housing value (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber, 2014;
Muehlenbachs et al., 2015; Balthrop and Hawley, 2017; Boslett et al., 2019), risks to
human health (Finkel and Law, 2011; Adgate et al., 2014; Deziel et al., 2018; Hill, 2018;
Denham et al., 2019), and increased crime rates (James and Smith, 2017; Bartik et al.,
2019), among others.3
Despite the presence of a handful of anecdotes and news reports on the adverse e↵ects
of hydraulic fracturing on agriculture, there is a surprising dearth of studies quantify-
ing such e↵ects empirically. Shale development can impose externalities on agriculture
primarily through contamination of irrigation water and soil, in addition to competition
for production inputs, including water and land. Water and soil pollution can result
from sediments from the construction of drilling platforms; spills, overflows, and seepage
from storage pits and tanks; inadequate cleaning of flowback water (wastewater) from
fracturing operations, which consists of fracturing fluid and materials from the shale for-
mation (e.g., saltwater, organic compounds, heavy metals, and radioactive substances);
and underground migration from leaking and disposal wells (Congressional Budget O ce,
2014). In face of rapid expansion of unconventional oil and gas industry, which has the
potential to displace a large share of farming activity (Gaudet et al., 2006), local, state,
and federal policymakers might worry about the viability of local agricultural economies.
Consequently, the impact of shale development on agricultural production is an important
policy question.
In this study, we seek to quantify the causal e↵ect of hydraulic fracturing on agri-
cultural productivity in Kern County, California. The state of California is the leading
agricultural state in the United States and among the top-10 oil-producing states in the
country, while Kern County leads the state in terms of both agricultural production and
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oil/gas extraction (California Department of Food and Agriculture, 2019; California De-
partment of Conservation, 2020). Our study, and decision to focus on Kern County, are
motivated by a flurry of news reports on systemic (agricultural) water contamination
in Kern due to nearby fracking activities. The news reports provide crucial informa-
tion about the onset of agricultural water contamination incidents and ensuing negative
externalities on crop yield. Our empirical strategy is based on a di↵erence-in-di↵erences-
style event study analysis. Specifically, a di↵erence-in-di↵erence (DID) approach exploits
variation in crop yield in Kern County and other California counties without fracking
activities, both before and after the initial report on water contamination incidents, to
identify the impact of hydraulic fracturing on major crop yields. The main identifying
assumption of DID is that in the absence of negative externalities of fracking, the pro-
ductivity in the treatment and control groups would follow similar trends. We implement
an event study analysis to show that the parallel trends assumption generally holds for
pre-treatment periods and to examine the evolution of the treatment e↵ect over time.
Most of the cropland in Kern County is located near fracking sites or on the Monterey-
Temblor shale play (see Figure 2.1). It is not uncommon to observe fracking wells in the
middle of farmland. Notwithstanding, there is still a certain degree of heterogeneity with
respect to proximity to fracking sites by crop type. In general, almond, pistachio, potato,
grapes (wine), and alfalfa fields tend to be closer to fracking sites than other crops, which
is also reflected in our analysis. Specifically, we find negative, statistically significant
e↵ect of hydraulic fracturing on the yields of almonds, pistachios, and grapes (wine),
after controlling for a rich set of controls (including temperature, precipitation, pesticides,
and economic variables) and unobservable fixed year and regional e↵ects. We also find
that alfalfa and potatoes generally show no e↵ect, which can partly be attributed to the
crops’ chemical tolerance. Di↵erent crops (field, vegetable, forage, fruit) have di↵erent
tolerance levels to chemicals and trace elements found in irrigation water and soil. Of
primary importance to our study is the analysis by Fipps (2003), who shows that nuts
and fruits are generally more sensitive to chemicals, while alfalfa and potatoes are more
tolerant, which helps to explain our observed findings.
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Figure 2.1: Hydraulic fracturing and agriculture in Kern County. Data on fracking
and waste disposal wells (as of 2018) are obtained from the Division of Oil, Gas, and
Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) of California Department of Conservation. Data
on percolation pits (as of 2018) are obtained from California Water Boards.The
cropland layer is obtained from the Kern County Agriculture Department.
Our study contributes to the energy policy and agricultural literature by shedding
light on the nature and extent of the e↵ects of unconventional oil and gas infrastructure
on agricultural productivity (specifically, productivity of individual crops), using Kern
County, California, as a case study. To that end, the present paper is also related to
the strand of industrial organization literature that explores inter-industry externalities.
Further, this study, to our knowledge, is the first to leverage both cross-sectional and
inter-temporal variation in crop yield to analyze the dynamic e↵ects of fracking on in-
dividual crop productivity. Granted many oil and gas producing regions in the United
States and Canada often have a large agricultural presence, our findings have important
policy implications for agriculture in terms of its co-existence with hydraulic fracturing.
This is especially true, and timely, in case of California, as there are plans to open over 1
million acres of public and private lands in Central California—California’s most produc-
tive agricultural region—for shale development (Phillips, 2019) in addition to the recent
fracking ban falls short (Willon, 2021).
The current study does not aim to provide a complete cost-benefit analysis of frack-
ing’s coexistence with agriculture,4 and whether unconventional oil and gas extraction is
7
net-welfare improving is well-beyond the scope of this study. The main goal of endeavors
undertaken here is to understand agricultural risks associated with shale development,
which is informative for the long-term viability of agriculture. Moreover, we do not at-
tempt to investigate each individual channel through which fracking can potentially exert
externalities onto agriculture, though we lean towards the industry’s impact on irriga-
tion water quality. Instead, we focus on the overall e↵ects of fracking on agriculture, a
more general topic that surprisingly has not received enough attention, and obtain some
important findings that hopefully pave the way for subsequent, micro-level analysis.
Related literature. The literature on the impact of hydraulic fracturing on agricul-
tural productivity is scarce, even more so for studies establishing any causal linkages.5
Allred et al. (2015) provide a first empirical assessment of the scale of vegetation removal
by oil and gas development in North America. The study finds that the total amount lost
in rangelands is the equivalent of more than half of annual available grazing on public
lands, whereas the amount of biomass lost in croplands is the equivalent of 120.2 million
bushels of wheat, about 6% of the wheat produced in the region in 2013. Importantly,
the study stresses that the loss is likely long-lasting and potentially permanent. In a
recent study, Fitzgerald et al. (2020) examine the short- and long-term impact of oil
and gas infrastructure expansion on agricultural land use in North Dakota. Using re-
mote sensing data on land cover with oil/gas well location data, the study finds that
drilling is associated with reduced surrounding crop cover and increased fallow acreage,
with the duration of these e↵ects varying across agricultural land covers. The findings of
these studies contribute to our understanding of the e↵ects of fracking on overall state of
agricultural production.
In a concurrent study, Farah (2019) investigates the causal e↵ect of proximity to
hydraulic fracturing wells on agricultural productivity in Alberta, Canada. The findings
of this study show that drilling during farming months is associated with reduced irrigated
crop yields, while dryland crops are not significantly a↵ected. Although Farah’s (2019)
study looks at a more dis-aggregated level of productivity (specifically, productivity of
irrigated vs. dryland crops) compared to Allred et al. (2015) and Fitzgerald et al. (2020),
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the study still falls short of illuminating the e↵ects of fracking on individual crops.
Our study fills this gap in the literature by zeroing in on the impact of hydraulic frac-
turing on the productivity of individual crops. As such, the findings of the present study
help agricultural producers and policymakers determine crop types that are vulnerable
to fracking-related externalities, as well as those that are relatively resilient. This, in
turn, allows policymakers and well operators to better negotiate and determine location
of drilling activities in order to ameliorate the negative e↵ects of fracking on agricultural
production. Last but not least, our study is also first to document crop-level e↵ects of
burgeoning fracking industry in California, which is the world’s one of the most agricul-
turally fertile regions as well as the center of recent controversies around expansion of
shale oil extraction (Willon, 2020).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.3 provides background
information on the study region: in Section 2.3.1 we review hydraulic fracturing and
agricultural activities in Kern County, California; in Section 2.3.2 we discuss the nature
of negative externalities of fracking on irrigation water; and in Section 3.5.1 we describe
our research design and identification strategy. In Section 2.4, we present the data, while
in Section 2.5 we discuss our empirical approach to measure the causal e↵ect of fracking
on agricultural productivity. The results appear in Section 2.6,with a host of robustness
checks in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 provides discussions and policy implications of the
study’s findings and Section 2.9 concludes.
2.3 Background
2.3.1 Shale drilling and agriculture in California and Kern County
Hydraulic fracturing has a long history in California, with fracking activities taking place
in the state as early as 1980s. In California, fracking is principally used for oil, in contrast
to other places, including Texas and Pennsylvania, where it is mainly used for natural
gas extraction. Most fracking operations in the state happen on the Monterey Shale play
(see Figure 2.2), an oil-rich sedimentary formation located in central and southern parts
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Figure 2.2: Hydraulic fracturing in California. Data on fracking and waste disposal
wells (as of 2018) are obtained from the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Re-
sources (DOGGR) of California Department of Conservation. Data on percolation
pits (as of 2018) are obtained from California Water Boards. Kern County is shaded
in gray.
oil formation in the United States (US Energy Information Administration, 2011). The
Monterey Shale play is di↵erent from other shale plays in that its geological formation does
not require lengthy horizontal drilling procedures and injection of millions of gallons of
water into the reservoir rock to allow oil and gas extraction, a scene commonly observed in
other places. The Monterey Shale play is naturally fractured due to constant movements
of two tectonic plates—the Pacific Plate and the North American Plate—on which the
state of California sits. This explains why most hydraulically fractured wells in California
are vertical and require relatively less water and time to pressurize the reservoir rock.
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Kern County is located in Central California, right on the Monterey Shale formation,
and is the largest fracking county in the state. As shown in Table 2.1, most of the state’s
active and new hydraulic fracturing wells, as well as percolation pits (a type of oil/gas
wastewater pit; see Section 2.3.2 for details), are located in Kern County. Importantly,
hydraulic fracturing activities take place in the western part of the county, where the
shale play is located, which also happens to be the county’s agricultural epicenter (see
Figure 2.1). Given such proximity of the two industries, and their role in the regional
economy, it naturally becomes crucial to understand the e↵ects of one industry on another.
California is the leading agricultural state in the United States with over $50 billion
worth of agricultural output produced in 2018, which represents over 13% of the U.S. total
(California Department of Food and Agriculture, 2019). California’s crop cash receipts in
2018 were greater than the combined receipts of the next two top agricultural states, Iowa
and Texas. The state’s leading agricultural crops in terms of revenue have traditionally
been fruits, nuts, and vegetables.
Kern County is California’s one of the leading agricultural counties, ranked first in
2017 in terms of total value of production and second in 2018 (behind Fresno). The county
produced over $7 billion worth of agricultural products in 2018, leading the state in the
production of almonds, grapes, and pistachios, which are the state’s top 3 agricultural
crops in terms of export value (California Department of Food and Agriculture, 2019).
Given the Mediterranean climate of Kern, with an average of 6.49 inches of precipitation
per year, the county’s agriculture is dependent on other water sources. According to the
Water Association of Kern County (WAKC), 36% of water consumed in the county comes
from groundwater, 26% from the California Aqueduct, 20% from the Kern River, 12%
from Friant-Kern Canal, and 6% from local streams and other sources.6 As a result, the
quality of local groundwater and the Kern River is important for local farming activities.
In terms of contribution to the regional economy, the value added by California’s
agricultural industry to the state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has historically been
greater than that of its oil and gas industry, with 2008 being an exception (see Fig-
ure 2.3). The gross value created by the state’s agricultural sector has generally been
11







Kern 2495 447 968 42 3952
Ventura 314 0 34 110 458
Los Angeles 17 0 12 11 40
Sutter 15 0 0 0 15
Orange 14 0 7 7 28
Santa Barbara 8 0 4 3 15
Kings 4 0 2 0 6
Santa Clara 3 0 0 1 4
Colusa 3 0 0 0 3
Fresno 2 0 1 0 3
Monterey 1 1 4 1 7
San Luis Obispo 1 0 4 1 6
Glenn 1 0 0 0 1
Solano 0 0 0 1 1
Humboldt 0 0 1 0 1
Madera 0 0 1 0 1
Percolation pits
Kern 473 19 475 0 967
Tulare 23 0 6 0 29
Fresno 22 5 23 0 50
Kings 12 0 2 0 14
Monterey 3 0 0 4 7
Santa Barbara 1 0 0 9 10
Los Angeles 0 0 0 439 439
Ventura 0 0 2 387 389
San Luis Obispo 0 0 0 4 4
San Benito 0 0 1 0 1
Note: Data on fracking wells (as of 2018) are obtained from the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal
Resources (DOGGR) of California Department of Conservation. Data on percolation pits (as of 2018)
are obtained from California Water Boards.
stable, hovering around 1.1% of the state’s total GDP, while the value added by its oil and
gas sector has reflected the dynamics around horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.
In particular, with the advances in unconventional drilling technologies and production
strategies (triggered in part by high oil prices), the contribution of oil and gas industry
to the state economy soared during the shale boom period, briefly surpassing agriculture
in 2008. But, with a sharp decline in the world oil prices, which made unconventional
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Figure 2.3: Contributions of agriculture and oil/gas extraction to California’s GDP.
Data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Kern County agri-
culture and oil/gas data are represented by data for Bakersfield Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area, which includes all of Kern County. Kern County oil and gas information
for 2012 is unavailable due to confidentiality reasons.
mirrored in the industry’s contribution to the economy.
Granted its fortuitous geological location, Kern County reaped the economic benefits
of the shale boom. The county’s oil and gas revenues were generally comparable to those
from agriculture in the early 2000’s, but rapidly expanded thereafter and remained about
twice as large as farm revenues until 2014, after which the oil and gas revenues plummeted.
Kern County made up on average 9% of California’s total GDP from agriculture and 28%
of the state’s total GDP from oil and gas extraction.
2.3.2 Shale drilling and risks of irrigation water contamination
The impact of fracking on drinking and irrigation water quality is well documented (Os-
born et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2013; Olmstead et al., 2013; Vidic et al., 2013; Darrah
et al., 2014; Vengosh et al., 2014; Hill and Ma, 2017; Harkness et al., 2018; Zou et al.,
2018; McMahon et al., 2019; Gao et al., 2020). Unconventional oil and gas operations are
water intensive, with the water-use intensity projected to continue increasing over time
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(Kondash et al., 2018). Large volumes of water is mixed with industrial chemicals and
proppant to obtain fracturing fluid that is injected into a vertical or horizontal well to
fracture low-permeability oil-bearing formations to allow extraction of hydrocarbons. The
two main sources of drinking and irrigation water contamination are linked to fracturing
fluid and, particularly, wastewater resulting from fracturing operations, which consists
of fracturing fluid and materials from the shale formation, including saltwater, organic
compounds, heavy metals, and radioactive substances.
Wastewater spills, which can happen during transportation from oil fields to disposal
sites, are frequently reported near fracking sites. Given high concentrations of dissolved
chemicals and other contaminants in the flowback waters, oil and gas wastewater spills
leave surface water and soil with elevated levels of contaminants (e.g., Ammonium, Vana-
dium, Boron, Manganese, Selenium, Lead, Radium) for an extended period of time fol-
lowing an incident (Lauer et al., 2016). In addition, accidental release of fracturing fluids
or chemicals is also observed around fracking sites. Between 2009 and 2014, a total of
575 wastewater spills and 31 fracturing fluid/chemical spills were reported in California,
of which 55% and 42%, respectively, occurred in Kern County (Long et al., 2016). To
put the extent of environmental damages inflicted by such spills into perspective, Adams
(2011) conducted an experimental release of hydraulic fracturing fluids in a deciduous for-
est in West Virginia. The results of this experiment showed a severe damage to ground
vegetation in just ten days and mortality of about half of the trees in two years.
Improper disposal of massive amounts of wastewater is another major contributing
channel for surface and groundwater pollution. In California, produced water from oil
and gas operations is commonly disposed of in one of four ways: (i) injection into Class II
(non-hazardous) wells;7 (ii) injection into unlined (percolation/evaporation) pits; (iii) re-
injection for enhanced oil recovery; and (iv) re-use in irrigation (after proper treatment).
A significant portion of over 130 billion gallons of wastewater annually produced from the
state’s oil and gas activities is disposed of in unlined wastewater pits (Grinberg, 2014;
Long et al., 2016), which is an inexpensive disposal method.8 Kern County happens
to be the home for most of these pits (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1). Unlined pits,
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which are designed to percolate wastewater into the ground and evaporate it into the air,
arguably pose the greatest threat to drinking and irrigation water quality as produced
water entering underground has the potential to contaminate aquifers and other water
resources. Because of a significant risk of water pollution (and numerous actual incidents),
this practice has been banned in several states, including Texas, Ohio, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, and New Mexico, except in California, where it is still practiced broadly
by the oil and gas industry (Kell, 2011; Heberger and Donnelly, 2015).9 Complicating
the matters in Kern is the history of chronic, illicit operation of hundreds of (unlined)
wastewater pits (Cart, 2015; Grinberg, 2016).
Taken together, there are di↵erent channels by which fracking activities can a↵ect
irrigation water quality in California, and thereby pose risks on crop yield and produc-
tion. In the following section, we show the situation in Kern County well exemplifies
fracking-related irrigation water quality problems, and ultimately fracking versus farm-
ing quandary.
2.3.3 Why Kern County: Identification
As discussed in previous sections, Kern leads California in terms of both agricultural
production and unconventional oil and gas extraction, with most of the state’s hydraulic
fracturing as well as wastewater disposal wells/pits located in the county. Such concen-
tration and proximity of the two industries make Kern an ideal candidate (treatment
unit) for a comparative case study.
One way to identify the causal e↵ect of fracking on agriculture is by comparing agri-
cultural productivity in Kern County with those of other California counties that do not
have any fracking activities in a di↵erence-in-di↵erences or event study framework. A
potential concern with this approach is the timing of occurrence of actual negative ex-
ternalities (specifically, water pollution) in relation to the start of fracking activities in
the region. After all, it is not fracking per se, but its negative externalities that matter
for agricultural productivity. One can seemingly argue that there might have been no
or negligible externalities in the early days of fracking in the region and any measurable
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externalities (if any) may have emerged with the growth and expansion of the indus-
try over time. In the absence of knowledge about the onset of negative externalities of
fracking on agriculture, the estimated e↵ect of fracking would be averaged over period
encompassing fracking’s existence in the region, potentially resulting in underestimation
of the treatment e↵ect.
In this study, we hone the identification of negative externalities of fracking on agri-
culture by using local and national news reports that carefully document the onset and
progression of irrigation water contamination incidents (due to fracking), and ensuing
declines in crop productivity, in Kern. According to investigative news reports, Kern
farmers started to notice problems with their irrigation water and crop yield from around
2010, which they fiercely attributed to the pollution of irrigation water as a result of the
nearby fracking activities. Specifically:
“[F]armers, like Mike Hopkins, suspect that wastewater might be what’s
killing their crops, and impacting our food supply. [...] The problem began
about eight years ago when the leaves of his newly planted cherry orchard
started turning brown, Hopkins said. Soon the almond trees followed. [...]
The water tests provided a clue. [...] His irrigation water contained the very
same salty compounds found in the wastewater produced by dozens of nearby
oil wells.” (CBS News, 2017)
The Food Safety and Modernization Act (FMSA) of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) requires that growers test their irrigation water (to create a microbial
water quality profile) for the safe growing and harvesting. So, farmers sampling their
agricultural water is a common practice. The problem reported with cherry and almond
trees can be rationalized in light of the findings of Fipps (2003) and Adams (2011), as
discussed previously. Increasingly, the reported number of incidences in the region surged
post-2010, which is also reflected by the frequency of coverage of the issue by news media
(e.g., Firstenfeld, 2012; Onishi, 2013; Cart, 2014; Cox, 2014; Gaworecki, 2014; Onishi,
2014; Baker, 2015; Ayers, 2017).10 Following excerpts portray the growing magnitude of
issues with water quality in the region:
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“A local farming company [Palla] has sued four Kern County oil producers,
claiming their waste disposal injections contaminated groundwater it uses for
irrigation. [...] It says extra watering and even replacing some cherry trees
failed to revive them, so Palla removed the trees in 2012. [...] Meanwhile,
Palla says its surrounding almond orchard has begun to experience contin-
uing production declines. [...] The suit claims the four oil production com-
panies raised salt and boron levels in local groundwater during high-pressure
injection. [...] Several disputes between local growers and oil pro-
ducers have surfaced in recent years. [...] The highest-profile conflict
involved Westside farmer Fred Starrh’s claim Bakersfield-based Aera Energy
LLC knowingly allowed produced water to contaminate Starrh’s groundwater.
A 2009 jury awarded him $9 million in damages.” (Cox, 2014)
“One environmental group has tested the irrigation water for oil field chem-
icals. [...] Laboratory analysis of those samples found compounds that are
toxic to humans, including acetone and methylene chloride—powerful indus-
trial solvents—along with oil. [...] Blake Sanden, an agriculture extension
agent and irrigation water expert with UC Davis, said “everyone smells the
petrochemicals in the irrigation water” in the Cawelo district [a water district
for Kern County]. [...] The Division of Oil, Gas & Geothermal Resources,
which regulates the state’s oil and gas industry, is already facing lawmakers’
ire after the recent discovery that about 2,500 oil wastewater injection
wells were allowed to operate in aquifers that, under federal standards,
contain clean water.” (Cart, 2014)
Increase in water pollution incidents in Kern post-2010 correlates with rapid expansion
of hydraulic fracturing activities in the region during that period. As shown in Figure 2.4,
the number of spudded wells—a well where actual drilling operations have commenced—
grew steadily before 2010, but skyrocketed after 2010, reaching a peak in 2012. Besides,
as noted in Section 2.3.2, most of the o cially reported wastewater spills also occurred






























Figure 2.4: Hydraulic fracturing activities in Kern County. Data on the number of
spudded wells are obtained from the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources
(DOGGR) of California Department of Conservation.
regulatory oversight, fracking wells were inevitably peppered along Kern’s agricultural
districts, often near or on the main water resources (Cart, 2014), thereby increasing the
industry’s friction with agriculture.
The cluster of news reports on the onset of fracking-related externalities in Kern pro-
vide a rare quasi-natural experiment to bypass the endogeneity issue in the identification
of fracking’s externalities on agriculture.11 We treat 2010 and onwards as the treatment
period for Kern, given overwhelming evidence for the onset of negative (water-related)
externalities in the county during that period, and pre-2010 as the pre-treatment period.
Treating Kern as the treatment unit and other California counties without fracking activ-
ities as control units, we implement a di↵erence-in-di↵erences-style event study analysis
(Bartik et al., 2019). A DID framework permits us to exploit variation in crop productiv-
ity in Kern and control counties, both before and after the onset of negative water-related
externalities, to tease out the e↵ects of fracking on crop productivity. To examine the
evolution of treatment e↵ect over the study period, and to capture any lead/lag e↵ects,
we structure our DID framework to perform event study analysis around 2010. An added
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benefit of event study analysis is that it helps us determine whether di↵erential pre-trends
pose a challenge to causal inference (Yip, 2018; Bartik et al., 2019; Cano-Urbina et al.,
2019; Li et al., 2019).
Admittedly, it is desirable to consider other fracking counties in California as addi-
tional treatment units in the analysis. However, the absence of information about the
onset of fracking-related externalities (if any) in other fracking counties in the state pre-
cludes such analysis. We feel uncomfortable with the idea of imposing an assumption
that other fracking counties might have experienced water-related problems around the
same point in time as Kern. Besides, hydraulic fracturing activities are not as intense
in other counties in the state as it is in Kern (see Table 2.1). Nevertheless, this does
not diminish the contribution of the present study as the empirical examination of Kern
County, which is the state’s major agricultural and oil/gas producing county, in and of
itself represents an important contribution to the emerging literature in this area.
2.4 Data
We construct county-level panel data for the period between 2004-2015.12 This allows us
to have about five-year window both in the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods.
Table 2.2 reports the study variables along with their sources.13 In this study, we focus
on the productivity of five major crops (in terms of value generated) in Kern County over
the study period. After all, the impact of fracking (if any) on the county’s main crops is
what ultimately matters for policy. On average, almonds generated the most annual value
during the given period, followed by pistachios, alfalfa (hay), grapes (wine) and potatoes.
Similar to previous literature (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Cornaggia, 2013; Lobell et al.,
2014; Vigani and Kathage, 2019), we use crop yield as a measure of farm productivity,
which is our dependent variable of interest. The number of control counties that grow the
listed crops is shown in Table 2.2 (last column); the complete list is provided in Table A1
in the Appendix. For our analysis, we construct two di↵erent control pools: (i) California
counties without any fracking activities (clean control pool); and (ii) California counties
without any fracking activities plus counties with very little fracking activity (expanded
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Table 2.2: Study variables and sources.
Variable Source
Average Annual Number of
Crop Value Control Counties
Crop yield (ton/acre)
Almond (All) USDA $736,248,091 7 (11)
Pistachios USDA $337,446,091 4 (6)
Alfalfa (Hay) USDA $188,200,545 21 (29)
Grapes (Wine) USDA $101,837,364 24 (31)











Aggregate pesticides applied DPR
(lb/acre, crop-specific)
Economic
% of farm employment BEA
Annual growth, farm employment BEA
% of total income from farms BEA
Note: Average annual crop value is the average value of a crop produced in Kern County
between 2005-2015. Number of control counties indicates the number of California counties
without any fracking activities (number of California counties without any fracking activities
plus counties with very little fracking activity) that grow a listed crop. USDA stands for the
United States Department of Agriculture; PRISM stands for Parameter-elevation Regressions
on Independent Slopes Model, which is maintained by PRISM Climate Group at Oregon State
University; NOAA stands for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; DPR
stands for the California Department of Pesticide Regulation; and BEA stands for the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
control pool). We define counties with very little fracking activity as counties with less
than or equal to three active fracking wells and/or percolation pits and less than or equal
to 10 total (active + inactive + historical) fracking wells and/or percolation pits. The
reason we consider the second, expanded control pool is to demonstrate the robustness
of our analysis to the inclusion of additional (potentially, control-like) counties that grow
the crops analyzed in this study.

































































Figure 2.5: Major crop yields in Kern and control counties over the study period.
Crop yield in Kern County is indicated by a dark line. Crop yield in control counties
(i.e., California counties without fracking activities) is indicated by gray lines. A
vertical, dashed line denotes the beginning of treatment period.
is apparent that after 2010 there was a discernible dip in the yields of several crops
grown in Kern County (the dark line), including almonds, grapes (wine), pistachios, and
potatoes. Though the decline in the yield of potatoes was temporary, the other three
crops exhibited a sustained downward trend in their yields post-2010. Incidentally, post-
2010 is also the period when the number of spudded fracking wells soared (see Figure 2.4),
and the reported wastewater spills took place, in the county. On the other hand, alfalfa
yield seems to have evolved without any aberrations. From the plots of pistachios and
potatoes, it also appears that there are control counties (the gray lines) experienced a
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drop in the yields of these crops after 2010, albeit for shorter period than for Kern. The
primary goal of a comparative case study method employed in this study is by comparing
the treatment and control units while controlling for any other intervention e↵ect from
broader economic and regional factors that a↵ect all the units (treatment and controls)
equally.
Following the established practice (see, for instance, Lobell et al., 2007; Chopin and
Blazy, 2013; Zhao et al., 2017), we consider main determinants of agricultural productiv-
ity, including temperature, precipitation, and pesticides applied. Because of heterogene-
ity in growing and harvesting months of the five crops, temperature and precipitation
variables are crop-specific. In particular, we take averages of these variables over active
farming months of a given crop in a given year.14 Pesticide variable represents the amount
of aggregate pesticides applied per harvested acre, and is also crop specific. Similar to
Lobell et al. (2014), we also consider the Palmer drought severity index (yearly average)
as a measure of drought, which is a predictor of crop water stress.
Evapotranspiration is commonly used in the literature as a predictor of, or, even as
a proxy for, crop yield (Allison et al., 1958; Hillel and Guron, 1973; Allen et al., 1998;
Gao et al., 2017; Mulovhedzi et al., 2020).15 Granted that evapotranspiration captures
the e↵ects of temperature, relative humidity, wind and air movement, and soil-moisture
availability, the variable can be used alone as a control for these factors. Therefore, we
first perform analysis with traditional temperature and climate variables, and then with
evapotranspiration as a robustness check. This variable is also crop-specific.
Finally, in the spirit of Cornaggia (2013), we control for a number of economic factors
that may a↵ect agricultural production, including percent of farm employment, annual
growth in farm employment, and percent of total income from farms.
2.5 Empirical strategy
As discussed in Section 3.5.1, our research design allows us to identify the e↵ect of frack-
ing’s externalities on agricultural productivity by leveraging variation in a crop yield in
Kern County (treatment unit) and other California counties without fracking activities
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(control units), before and after the onset of negative water-related externalities. To
this end, a DID-style event study analysis o↵ers a suitable framework to investigate the
evolution and dynamics of the treatment e↵ect over time.
Starting point of DID-style event study analysis is a standard DID specification (Gal-
lagher, 2014). And is given by the following regression equation:
yit = ↵⇥ Treatit +Xit  + µi +  t + "it (1)
where yit is crop yield in county i in year t; Treatit is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if i represents Kern County and t is the post-intervention period, and 0
otherwise; Xit is a vector of explanatory variables that influence crop yield;   are the
parameters of other control variables; µi and  t capture county and year fixed e↵ects
(FE), respectively; and "it is the idiosyncratic error term. The parameter ↵ represents
the average treatment e↵ect (ATE) on the treated unit in DID framework. In order
to conduct event study analysis, we replace Treatit in equation (1) with a full set of
Kerni ⇥ Y eart interaction terms, for t = {2004, . . . , 2015}. We estimate the resulting
equation separately for each crop listed in Table 2.2. For both DID and event study
analysis, we report standard errors clustered at county level that are robust to both
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
The advantage of event study analysis is that it serves as an internal validity check
on the DID estimation. The key identifying assumption of DID is that, conditional on
observable factors, the productivity in Kern County (treatment unit) and other California
counties without fracking activities (control units) would follow similar trends in the
absence of negative externalities of fracking (treatment). This is commonly known as the
parallel/common trends assumption. If the pre-treatment period estimates of fracking
from event study analysis are mostly statistically insignificant, it provides evidence that
the treatment unit was no di↵erent than control units prior to the onset of negative
externalities of fracking.
To guard against the possibility that unobservable factors are responsible for the
results, we explore the robustness of our main findings with respect to (i) the set of
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explanatory variables used, (ii) control pool counties, and (iii) nonlinear climate e↵ects.
We also devise a counterfactual analysis using evapotranspiration, a commonly used proxy
for crop yield, that is largely shielded from the water-related externalities of fracking.
2.6 Main results
Our main specification uses standard predictors of crop yield (precipitation, temperature,
PDSI, pesticide and economic variables) and control counties without any fracking activi-
ties (clean control pool). Although it is not uncommon to model the relationship between
crop yield and temperature linearly, some previous studies advocated for a flexible model-
ing of the relationship between the two variables—accounting for any nonlinearities—for
more accurate inferences (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009; Zhao et al., 2017). In light of
this, we consider two di↵erent functional forms for the temperature variable: (i) first-
order polynomial (linear temperature e↵ect); and (ii) second-order polynomial (nonlinear
temperature e↵ect), which is the preferred specification.
The results from corresponding event study analyses are reported in Figure 2.6 (linear
temperature e↵ect) and Figure 2.7 (nonlinear temperature e↵ect). The figures plot the
coe cients associated with the interaction term Kerni ⇥ Y eart for each calendar year
(from 2005 to 2015) for each crop. These coe cients measure the average di↵erence in
crop yield between Kern and control counties by event year. The majority of the DID
point estimates in the pre-intervention period are either statistically insignificant or close
to zero: it is the case for almond in both figures (especially, in Figure 2.7), for grapes
in Figure 2.7, for pistachios in both figures, and for alfalfa in Figure 2.6. This suggests
that the common trends assumption of DID framework is reasonably satisfied for these
crops (Yip, 2018; Bartik et al., 2019; Cano-Urbina et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019). Although
the common trends assumption looks somewhat satisfied for potatoes in Figure 2.6 (also,
in robustness checks), it is not as strongly evident as one would like it to be; so caution
needs to be exercised in inferences for this crop.
It is apparent that three crops—almond, grapes (wine), and pistachios—grown in



























































Figure 2.6: Event study analysis using clean control pool and linear temperature
e↵ect. The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables
used are precipitation, temperature, PDSI, pesticide, and economic variables. All
specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Each dot represents the main
DID estimate from equation (1) in the corresponding year. The whiskers represent
the 95% confidence interval.
observe a gradual and systematic decrease in the yields of these crops after 2010, which
echoes expanding fracking activities in the region post-2010 (Figure 2.4) as well as growing
media coverage of the adverse e↵ects of fracking on agriculture. While almond yield tends
to rebound back to its pre-intervention level towards 2015, grapes and pistachios show
more sustained decrease in their yields, with grapes, in particular, exhibiting a more
pronounced negative e↵ect. On the other hand, alfalfa and potatoes do not seem to
































































Figure 2.7: Event study analysis using clean control pool and nonlinear temperature
e↵ect. The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables
used are precipitation, mean temperature, mean temperature squared, PDSI, pesti-
cide, and economic variables. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects.
Each dot represents the main DID estimate from equation (1) in the corresponding
year. The whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval.
post-intervention period are largely statistically insignificant.
We provide a parsimonious summary of the DID analysis that treats post-2010 as
the treatment period in Table 2.3 (linear temperature e↵ect) and Table 2.4 (nonlinear
temperature e↵ect).16
To save space, we only report the estimates of the main DID coe cient of interest
(Treatit); the full sets of estimation results are available from the authors upon request. In
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Table 2.3: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis using clean control pool and linear
temperature e↵ect.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Almond
Treatit  0.114⇤⇤⇤  0.115⇤⇤⇤  0.135⇤⇤⇤  0.135⇤⇤⇤  0.115⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 104 96 96 96 96
R2 0.041 0.078 0.059 0.114 0.128
Grapes (Wine)
Treatit  0.818⇤⇤⇤  0.592  0.465⇤⇤⇤  0.553⇤  0.823⇤⇤⇤
(0.256) (0.582) (0.159) (0.310) (0.197)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 300 276 255 276 255
R2 0.003 0.008 0.022 0.020 0.112
Pistachios
Treatit  0.564⇤⇤⇤  0.497⇤⇤⇤  0.500⇤⇤⇤  0.655⇤⇤⇤  0.421⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.042) (0.164) (0.079) (0.111)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 63 59 49 59 49
R2 0.123 0.255 0.195 0.315 0.437
Potatoes
Treatit 2.552 3.342⇤⇤ 2.185 2.421⇤ 2.850⇤⇤
(1.896) (1.540) (1.671) (1.383) (1.353)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 88 82 81 82 81
R2 0.017 0.175 0.018 0.158 0.261
Alfalfa (Hay)
Treatit  0.047 0.222⇤ 0.159 0.059 0.180⇤
(0.114) (0.122) (0.128) (0.117) (0.108)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 289 269 260 269 260
R2 0.0001 0.043 0.007 0.031 0.089
Note: The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used are
precipitation, temperature, PDSI, pesticide, and economic variables. All specifications include
county and year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county level and
robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
general, the estimates from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that fracking has reduced almond
yield in Kern County by -0.114 to -0.135 ton per harvested acre, that converted into
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Table 2.4: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis using clean control pool and nonlinear
temperature e↵ect.
Almond Grapes (Wine) Pistachios Alfalfa Potatoes
Treatit  0.146⇤⇤  0.926⇤⇤⇤  0.409⇤⇤⇤ 0.167 2.850⇤⇤
(0.060) (0.206) (0.108) (0.115) (1.369)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 96 255 49 260 81
R2 0.138 0.120 0.443 0.091 0.261
Note: The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used
are precipitation,mean temperature, mean temperature squared, PDSI, pesticide, and eco-
nomic variables. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors
in parenthesis are clustered at county level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
$165,739,470 to $196,270,425 per year; grape yield by -0.465 to -0.926 ton per harvested
acre, that converted into $36,522,960 to $72,669,702 per year; and pistachio yield by -0.409
to -0.655 ton per harvested acre, that converted into $100,299,888 to $160,588,970 per
year17. Among these crops, Almond clearly appear to have been more severely impacted
by fracking’s externalities in terms of dollar amount. Importantly, our findings for these
three crops are robust to various alternative specifications and robustness checks (see
Section 2.7), including larger sample size.
The results for potatoes and alfalfa reveal largely insignificant e↵ects of fracking on
the yields of these crops. The significant positive e↵ects reported for these two crops in
select specifications do not survive all of our robustness checks (see Section 2.7.2), so we
recommend to interpret them with caution.
Our main findings—the significant negative e↵ect on almond, grapes, and pistachios
and insignificant e↵ect on potatoes and alfalfa—can partly be explained by individual
crop chemical tolerance level. As documented by Fipps (2003), alfalfa and potatoes fall
into the category of “tolerant” and “semi-tolerant”, respectively, crops in terms of their
tolerance to di↵erent types of water chemicals correlated with crop yield potential. In
contrast, nuts and grapes are classified as “extremely sensitive” and “sensitive”crops,
respectively. This, in conjunction with our discussions in Sections 2.3.2 and 3.5.1, shed
some light on the nature of our observed findings.
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2.7 Robustness checks
2.7.1 Expanded control pool
Our main specification in Section 2.6 uses what we call “clean control pool”—control
counties that have never had any fracking activities. This requirement placed on the
selection of control counties may be viewed as strict as counties with hardly any frack-
ing activities, especially if fracking wells/pits are no longer active, could also serve as
valid control units. After all, the fewer the wells/pits, the lower is the chance of a
spill/leakage/seepage. Therefore, we include California counties with less than or equal
to three active fracking wells and/or percolation pits and less than or equal to 10 total
(active + inactive + historical) fracking wells and/or percolation pits in our “expanded
control pool”. The expanded control pool, to the extent, allows us to test for the robust-
ness of our main results to control pool as well as to larger sample size for individual
crops.
The estimation results are reported in Appendix 4.7: the event study analysis appears
in Figure A2 (linear temperature e↵ect) and Figure A3 (nonlinear temperature e↵ect);
the DID analysis that treats post-2010 as the treatment period is presented in Table A3
(linear temperature e↵ect) and Table A4 (nonlinear temperature e↵ect). In general, the
results from analysis using expanded control pool are consistent with those from our clean
control pool, both in terms of significance and magnitude of individual point estimates.
This suggests the analysis of select crops in our main specification is not prone to a small
sample bias. Like previously, we find significant negative e↵ect of fracking on the yields
of almond, grapes, and pistachios. Though the analysis for potatoes and alfalfa present
largely insignificant e↵ect, in select specifications we observe a positive e↵ect.
2.7.2 An alternative control for temperature and climate variables
Evapotranspiration captures the e↵ects of temperature and relative humidity, in addition
to wind and air movement and soil-moisture availability. In essence, evapotranspiration
is a more well-rounded index that is designed specifically for crop yield prediction. This
explains its widespread use as a predictor of, or, even as a proxy for, crop yield in the
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literature (Allison et al., 1958; Hillel and Guron, 1973; Gao et al., 2017; Mulovhedzi et al.,
2020). While our main specification utilizes a rich set of controls for temperature and
climate, it does not explicitly control for soil-moisture availability. To demonstrate the
robustness of our main findings to both temperature and climate variables as well as
soil-moisture availability, we re-estimate our models by replacing traditional temperature
and climate variables with evapotranspiration.
We present the corresponding estimation results in Appendix 4.7: the event study
analysis appears in Figure A4 (clean control pool) and Figure A5 (expanded control pool);
the DID analysis that treats post-2010 as the treatment period is presented in Table A5
(clean control pool) and Table A6 (expanded control pool). Again, our estimates are
largely consistent with those from analysis in previous sections. Of notable importance is
the observation that the treatment e↵ect for potatoes and alfalfa is strictly insignificant
across various specifications in Tables A5 and A6. This shows that the significant positive
e↵ects observed for these two crops in select specifications from previous sections are not
robust, and hence should be interpreted with care.
2.7.3 A counterfactual analysis
One way to verify the robustness of our inferences on the presence or absence of fracking’s
e↵ect on crop productivity is to find a variable that is a solid proxy for a given crop yield
but one that is ideally not prone to fracking’s water-related externalities, and then perform
the analysis using that variable as an outcome variable of interest. If the analysis with
such variable yields insignificant e↵ects in the post-intervention period, while the analysis
with an actual corresponding crop yield produces significant negative e↵ect, it indicates
that whatever negative e↵ect observed for the actual crop yield must be due to fracking.
Conversely, if the analysis with a proxy variable also produces significant negative e↵ect
in the post-intervention period similar to the actual crop yield, it implies the observed
negative e↵ect for the actual crop yield is not due to fracking, but is attributable to other
confounding factors.
Fortunately, in our case we have such a variable in evapotranspiration, which is com-
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monly used as a proxy for crop yield (see, for instance, Allison et al., 1958; Hillel and
Guron, 1973; Gao et al., 2017; Mulovhedzi et al., 2020). Similar to crop yield, evapotran-
spiration is determined by temperature, humidity, and soil-moisture availability, among
others. Unlike crop yield, however, evapotranspiration is not sensitive to various pollu-
tants contained in wastewater and fracturing fluid, except maybe salt (Allen et al., 1998,
Chapter 1). Consequently, by comparing event study analysis for evapotranspiration
(which, as noted before, is crop-specific) and actual crop yield, we can roughly identify
whether or not evapotranspiration behaves similar to crop yield in the post-intervention
period.
We re-estimate our models by replacing our original dependent variable (crop yield)
with evapotranspiration. The corresponding estimation results are reported in Appendix 4.7:
the event study analysis is presented in Figure A6 (clean control pool) and Figure A7 (ex-
panded control pool). For both samples, post-intervention period DID point estimates of
treatment e↵ect are largely statistically insignificant for all five crops. This lends support
to the robustness of our inferences: our main findings—the significant negative e↵ect on
almond, grapes, and pistachios—are not driven by other factors, but are attributable to
negative externalities of fracking.
2.8 Discussion
The emergence, and increasing frequency of, negative externalities of hydraulic fracturing
in Kern can rightfully be linked to California’s inadequate and lax regulatory environ-
ment around fracking. The fast-evolving development in shale gas and oil extraction
raised many unexpected social and environmental challenges. The gravity of the situ-
ation associated with fracking’s externalities in fact pushed the state of New York to
outright ban fracking in 2014, a suit followed by Vermont later in the year and Maryland
in 2017. Other states, including Texas, Ohio, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and New
Mexico, banned the use of percolation pit, considering it to pose a significant threat to
drinking and irrigation water quality (Kell, 2011; Heberger and Donnelly, 2015).
Surprisingly, in California there was no regulatory program specifically governing
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fracking and other unconventional drilling techniques until 2013 (Phillps, 2013). The
only regulations remotely controlling certain aspects of fracking before 2013 were the
Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974,
federal regulations that set guidelines for discharges of pollutants into the waters of the
United States. The CWA made discharge of wastewater into surface water unlawful
except with permit from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2018, 2019), while the SDWA allowed oil and
gas companies to inject wastewater into underground aquifers so long as they received
an Aquifer Exemption.18 In California, however, produced water was largely exempted
from federal hazardous waste requirements, resulting in inadequate oversight:
“State regulators face federal scrutiny for what critics say has been decades
of lax oversight of the oil and gas industry and fracking operations in par-
ticular. The Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources has admitted
that for years it allowed companies to inject fracking wastewater into pro-
tected groundwater aquifers, a problem they attributed to a history of chaotic
record-keeping.” (Cart, 2015)
The Senate Bill No. 4 (SB-4) approved in 2013 established a regulatory program
administered by the DOGGR of California Department of Conservation to finally regu-
late California’s under-regulated fracking industry. Among a few things, the bill required
information gathering and scientific review of the e↵ects of fracking and imposed new
permit requirements before fracking operations can be commenced. Notwithstanding,
the SB-4 was largely seen to be weak and “so watered down as to be useless” (The Times
Editorial Board, 2013). Even though the bill addressed some aspects of wastewater stor-
age and disposal, the regulations only applied to wells that have undergone a stimulation
treatment. Given wastewater is produced whether or not a well is stimulated, the bill
did not entirely solve the wastewater disposal by the state’s oil and gas industry.
The Senate Bill No. 1281 (SB-1281) passed in 2014 turned the tables for many oil
companies in California as it required well operators to report starting from January
1, 2015 the source and volume of water used in fracking operations as well as disposal
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of wastewater. The bill, however, did not require oil companies to reveal where their
wastewater is disposed of (California Legislative Information, 2014). The Senate Bill No.
83 (SB-83) Public Resources Section 45 approved in 2015 mandated the State Water Re-
sources Control Board of the California Water Boards to provide a status report on the
number and location of the wastewater disposal pits/wells within each California region
by January 30, 2016 and every six months thereafter (California Legislative Information,
2015). In September 23, 2018, however, the state signed the Senate Bill No. 1492 (Chap-
ter 742) that lifted the requirement for the California State Water Resources Control
Board to provide such bi-annual status reports (California Water Boards, 2019).
More recently, the state made some significant strides to tighten regulations around
fracking. In October 13, 2017, the state signed into law the Assembly Bill No. 1328, which
gave the California Water Boards an authority to obtain information about the chemicals
present in wastewater from oil and gas production. Further, in 2019, the state imposed a
new sets of regulations on fracking to protect California’s groundwater, including a ban
on the use of a high-pressure cyclic steaming process by new underground oil-extraction
wells (Gonzales, 2019).
2.9 Conclusion
The “Shale Revolution” propelled by advances in hydraulic fracturing in mid-2000’s has
enabled the United States to increase its production of oil and natural gas, thus lessening
the country’s dependence on oil imports. The rise and expansion of fracking activities
have also been associated with a number of well-documented negative externalities. In
this study, we aim to measure the impact of fracking on agricultural productivity using
Kern County, California—the state’s leading agricultural and oil/gas producing county—
as our case study. In spite of the presence of ample anecdotes and news reports on the
adverse e↵ects of fracking on agriculture, the empirical literature is surprisingly thin and
we know little of the e↵ects of fracking on individual crop yield.
Using the news reports to identify the onset of fracking’s water-related externalities,
this article quantifies the impact of fracking on five key crops grown in Kern. It finds
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negative, statistically significant e↵ects for almond, grapes (wine), and pistachios. Using
2015 commodity value and production of the specific crops, fracking has reduced almond
production by $165,739,470 to $196,270,425 per year, grape production by $36,522,960 to
$72,669,702 per year, and pistachio production by $100,299,888 to $160,588,970 per year.
In contrast, alfalfa and potatoes appear to be una↵ected by fracking’s externalities. The
heterogeneous e↵ect of fracking on crop yield—the significant negative e↵ect on almond,
grapes, and pistachios and insignificant e↵ect on potatoes and alfalfa—can be justified by
chemical tolerance level of individual crops. Our main findings pass a range of alternative
specifications and robustness checks.
The present study makes several distinct contributions to the literature. First, it con-
tributes to the energy policy and agricultural literature by revealing the nature and extent
of the e↵ects of unconventional oil and gas infrastructure on agricultural productivity.
To that end, we leverage both cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in crop yield
to show the dynamic e↵ects of fracking on crop yield. Given many oil and gas producing
regions in the United States and Canada usually have a large agricultural presence, our
findings have important policy implications for agriculture in terms of its co-existence
with hydraulic fracturing.
Second, the paper shows the heterogeneous impact of fracking on individual crop yield.
As such, our findings help agricultural producers and policymakers determine crop types
that are prone to fracking-related externalities, as well as those that are relatively resilient.
This, in turn, allows policymakers and well operators to better negotiate and determine
location of drilling activities in order to ameliorate the negative e↵ects of fracking on
agricultural production. Last but not least, our study is also first to document crop-level
e↵ects of burgeoning fracking industry in California, which has been the subject of recent
controversies (Phillips, 2019; Willon, 2020).
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Chapter 3
Unintended E↵ects of Preferential Tax Assessment on Farmland Protection: Evidence from
Utah’s Farmland Assessment Act
3.1 Abstract
Farmland preservation programs are adopted in many states in the United States to
protect farmland from urban development. With the goal of the Farmland Assessment
Act (FAA) in Utah being to preserve agriculture by providing tax breaks to agricultural
landowners, the objective of this study is to examine the e↵ect of FAA GreenBelt (GB)
appraisal on protecting farmland using a rigorous quasi-experimental research design.
There are several underlining policy implications from our findings. First, the GB desig-
nation protects peri-urban farmland at about 1.3% per GB parcel. Second, allowing for
non-agricultural use on GB parcels incentivizes urban development on parcels with larger
agricultural areas, which is contrary to the goal of the FFA.
3.2 Introduction
Humankind tends to settle on fertile land where crops can be produced (National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, 2004; Bryce, 2016). Yet, the most productive soil is
often located in peri-urban farmlands19 (Seto and Kaufmann, 2003; Brinkley, 2012; Li
et al., 2013),which are in close proximity to urban areas, surrounded by high populations
and development densities. These farmland are consequently experiencing intense devel-
opment pressure due to their lower market value ( relative to the value of residential and
commercial uses) (Jackson-Smith and Sharp, 2008; Brinkley, 2012). Despite their rela-
tively low market values, farmlands provide society with many non-market benefits, such
as ecosystem services (Brinkley, 2012; Barthel et al., 2015), wildlife habitat (Virginia and
Walls, 2005; Duke and Aull-Hyde, 2002), and local heritage (Kline and Wichelns, 1998),
in addition to the direct benefits from food production, and farm-related job creation.
Positive externalities are generally overlooked when private landowners make decisions on
whether to convert farmland to urban use or whether to sell land to a developer, leading
to an overdevelopment of the land. In an e↵ort to correct this market failure, various
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farmland preservation programs (FPPs) have been widely implemented across the United
States (Fischel, 1982; Bengston et al., 2004; Freedgood et al., 2020; American Farmland
Trust, 2020; Wu and Cho, 2007; Towe et al., 2008; Liu and Lynch, 2011a; USDA, 2018),
among others. However, the literature is thin with respect to measuring the e↵ectiveness
of such policies, largely due to the lack of counterfactuals to isolate the policy e↵ects
(Wu and Cho, 2007; Li, 2019). The literature is also less concerned with Utah, one of
the fastest growing states in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). The present
study fills this research gap by examining the e↵ect of Utah’s major FPP— the Farmland
Assessment Act (also called the FAA or Greenbelt Act)—on protecting farmland from
urban development using a quasi-experimental research design.
The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and the Farm Service Agency
(FSA) under the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA) are currently admin-
istrating over 20 voluntary programs and subprograms that assist agricultural producers
and landowners with conservation e↵orts on farmlands in the United States (Stubbs,
2020). The public policy options available for addressing the problem of farmland preser-
vation can be broadly classified into three policy systems — prescriptive regulation, forms
of direct governmental action, and taxation — as suggested by Williams (1970). Except
for a few cases such as “exclusive agricultural zoning” in Oregon and Hawaii, prescriptive
regulations concerning farmland conversion do not hold center stage in the US (Cough-
lin, 1991; Alterman, 1997). This is partly due to the potential legal challenges posed
by “government taking” of a landowner’s property, as well as the fact that agricultural
zoning restrictions are often mere policy statements of the county boards of supervisors,
which can be easily “undone” (Kruft, 2001)20.
In contrast to land-use regulations that limit landowners’ choices, direct governmental
actions seek to achieve similar regulatory control of private property while providing
landowners with some form of monetary compensation (Jacobs, 1999). Examples include
incentive-based easement programs in the forms of the “transfer of development right”
(TDR) program and the “purchase of development right” (PDR) program (Nickerson and
Lynch, 2001; Towe et al., 2008; Liu and Lynch, 2011a). These programs have been widely
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adopted nationwide (Nickerson and Lynch, 2001; Miskowiak and Stoll, 2006). The PDR
program is generally considered the most successful and e↵ective in achieving its goals
(Lynch and Musser, 2001) due to e ciency gains associated with voluntary exchange and
market-based compensation. In contrast, the TDR program requires that attainment of
market equilibrium.
Tax policy has generally sought to ease the burden of property taxation on agri-
cultural landowners, particularly for owners experiencing steep increases in land values
at the urban fringe. Tax breaks di↵erentiate use-value from market-value assessment,
and thus establishes a set of quasi-market signals guiding peri-urban landowners to pre-
serve their farmlands from urban development. The taxation approach is also popular
in the US. Every state has some form of preferential or di↵erential programs for farm-
land. Most states, including Utah, adopt the use-value assessment approach, which taxes
farmland according to current use rather than the prevailing market value (Malme, 1993;
Wunderlich, 1997; Kashian, 2004; England, 2012; Kuethe and Sherrick, 2014; Anderson
et al., 2015). Some states automatically enroll eligible parcels, whereas the majority of
the states require landowners to file applications for preferential assessment (England,
2012). When a land parcel becomes ineligible in the preferential assessment program,
there are three categories that the states actions’ fall into: no-penalty21, rollback tax22,
and percent-payback23 (England, 2002).
This paper assembles a variety of comprehensive annual data for Salt Lake County,
Utah from 2010-2017 to empirically assess the e↵ectiveness of Utah’s FAA as a prefer-
ential property tax program established for farmland protection. The data sets include
the parcel-level georeferenced property tax assessment data, the 30m-resolution USDA-
NASS Cropland Data Layer (CDL), and the NASA-developed MODIS-EVI (Moderate
Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer-Enhanced Vegetation Index) data. This combined
panel dataset is used to estimate the e↵ect of tax relief under the FAA on the conversion
rate of farmland to residential and commercial development. The FAA policy parameter
is identified in a quasi-experimental design using the method of two-stage least squares
(2SLS), conditional on parcel and ZIP code-by-year fixed e↵ects.
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This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it evaluates preferen-
tial property tax treatment in Utah, which is an understudied preservation program and
region in the Country. Prior research primarily investigates how an FPP such as agricul-
tural zoning a↵ects land values (Nelson, 1986, 1988; Irwin and Bockstael, 2001; Nickerson
and Lynch, 2001; Irwin, 2002; Geoghegan et al., 2003; Lynch et al., 2007; Deaton and
Vyn, 2010; Liu and Lynch, 2011b), among others. Only a limited number of studies have
examined the e↵ect of FPPs on preserving farmland from urban development. These
studies suggest that FPPs have slowed the rate of farmland conversion to urban use and
decreased farmland loss in the United States (Lynch and Carpenter, 2003; Brinkman
et al., 2005; Wu and Cho, 2007; Towe et al., 2008; Liu and Lynch, 2011a). Most of the
studies have focused on the evaluation of a PDR program in the eastern states except Wu
and Cho (2007), which assesses the e↵ect of various local land use regulations on land
development in five western states (California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington).
However, the e↵ect of a preferential property tax program on farmland preservation has
been generally overlooked. The broad acceptance of the FAA program in Utah, together
with the state’s rapid population and employment growth in the recent decade, provides
an opportunity to study the e↵ectiveness of this type of tax relief policy. To the best of
our knowledge, there has been no systematic analysis conducted on Utah’s FPP.
This paper’s second contribution is that its quasi-experimental research design pro-
vides solid grounds to test for an unintended e↵ect of the tax break from use-value
assessment on farmland preservation in Utah. Utah is among a few states that allow
agriculture to be the non-primary use of a so-called GB parcel, where the value of a GB
parcel is assessed for tax purposes based on productive agricultural-use value instead of
market value. Findings of this study confirm the concerns that Utah’s property owners
have exploited this policy “loophole” by converting part of an agricultural parcel to ur-
ban use while maintaining the minimum requirements necessary for ensuring their land
retaining GB designation. In 2016, the Utah Legislature introduced House Bill 25 to
amend the FAA in an e↵ort to prevent individuals and corporations from abusing the
law for its tax advantage. The bill did not pass despite a wave of discussion about the
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possible amendments in the future (Farm Progress, 2016). The present study provides
evidence-based policy recommendations to Utah legislators and land use planners in this
regard, which helps inform better policy decisions.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.3 provides background information on the
study region. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present data and methods, respectively. Section 3.6
discusses the estimation results. Section 3.7 interprets the magnitude of the FAA e↵ect
and discuss its policy implications. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.3 Background of the Utah FAA and the Underlying Mechanism
This section describes the background of the Utah FAA and the recent development
pressures experienced in Salt Lake County, Utah — the region of interest in the present
study. It then explores in detail the theoretical link between the FAA policy and land
conversion from agricultural to urban use, and discusses a number of channels through
which the FAA tax relief program may a↵ect farmland conversion. Finally, this section
summarizes the characteristics of GB and non-GB parcels in Salt Lake County .
3.3.1 The Utah FAA Amid Unprecedent Development Pressure
The Utah FAA (or the GB Act) was first passed back in 1969 as a standard type of
preferential property tax program is a type of FPP used in land use planning in sev-
eral other states (Daniels, 2010). A preferential property tax program reduces taxes on
qualifying undeveloped land that are reserved for undeveloped, wild, or agricultural use
in general, with the purpose of protecting wildlife, improving air quality, and ensuring
urban dwellers have access to the natural environment (West, 2018). This method of as-
sessment is vital to preserving peri-urban farmland, where market value often exceeds the
profit from agricultural operations, and where taxing farmland based on its market value
is considered economically prohibitive for most producers (Israelsen et al., 2009). Under
the FAA, the Utah legislature created a reference- of a fixed-rate taxable per acre for
di↵erent cropland and grazing land according to the condition of the land’s soils quality,
slope and erosion potential, drainage, climate, susceptibility to overflow or flooding, and
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management (Utah State Tax Commission, 2020a). All irrigated land, orchard lands, and
grazing lands located in Salt Lake County are rated as the highest class (class I). Utah
State Tax Commission evaluates the taxable valuations per acre each year for the di↵erent
types and classes of agricultural lands (Utah Property Tax Division, 2021). Landowners
are required to report the number of acres of di↵erent land types of land owned, to which
fixed tax rates for the specific types of land are applied each year.
To attain the GB tax relief assessment in Utah, three eligibility criteria must be met:
1) land/plot size, 2) land productivity, and 3) prior years’ land use (Utah State Legisla-
ture, 1987). The land size criterion requires that qualifying farmland must comprise at
least five acres. Farmland that is less than five acres may qualify if it is devoted to agri-
cultural use and planted in irrigated food crops (produce or orchard) in conjunction with
other eligible land under the same ownership (O ce of Legislative Research and General
Counsel, 2016). The income productivity criterion requires that the land parcel must
meet 50% of the average agricultural production per acre for the given type and location
of the land24. Utah state is the only state in the US that qualifies land parcel based on
crop production levels(O ce of Legislative Research and General Counsel, 2016). The
land use criterion requires that land must have been actively devoted to agricultural use
for at least two successive years immediately preceding the tax year when land attained
GB designation.
Agricultural landowners are required to file an application each year, followed by
an appraisal from the County’s Assessor’s O ce to determine if the land meets the re-
quired qualifications for that year. Eligibility must be supported by federal tax returns,
a davits, lease agreements, sales receipts, and production records, etc. When the agricul-
tural landowner fails to provide evidence that the land meets the required qualifications
or has been withdrawn from FAA, the owner becomes subject to a rollback tax25 for up
to five years; the tax rate and market value for each of the years in question is applied
to determine the tax (Utah State Tax Commission, 2020b).
While the goal of Utah’s GB program is to preserve farmland by providing incentives
or compensations to the landowners, it allows non-agriculture uses to be the primary use
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of a GB parcel as long as the parcel meets the aforementioned three criteria (O ce of
Legislative Research and General Counsel, 2016). As a result, commercial landowners
are not necessarily prevented from registering commercial land for GB appraisal to take
advantage of the program’s tax reduction, while continuing to earn profit from a par-
cel’s commercial usage (Farm Progress, 2016; Brown, 2017; Davidson, 2020). This raises
concerns about the e↵ectiveness of the GB program in preserving farmland.
Salt Lake County’s steadily rising population adds to the challenge of adequately pre-
serving farmland. Utah’s population has been growing fast over the past decade(U.S.
Census Bureau, 2019). It ranks high with respect to disproportionally converted Nation-
ally Significant land26 (Freedgood et al., 2020). Salt Lake County27 is the home to the
state’s largest metropolitan city (Salt Lake City), and has experienced unprecedented
pressure on farmland conversion in the past decade (Figure B1). Farmland in the County
went from over 32% in 2010 down to around 28% in 2018, whereas developed land was
up from 27% to 32% over the same period. Most of the farmland lost is located near
the center of the county, in close proximity with the majority of the county’s developed
land (figure B2). Meanwhile, new farmland has been cultivated at the outer edge of the
county, where the majority of the forested land and wetlands are located.
Salt Lake County’s farmland is classified as above the state median in terms of its
productivity, versatility, and resiliency (PVR) index (Freedgood et al., 2020). Urban
development “migrates” farmland to less fertile areas within the county. As urban areas
expands into the surrounding farmland, agricultural operations on remaining farmland
becomes economically prohibitive if that property taxes is taxed based on its market
values. The property tax rate in Salt Lake County varies slightly by locations and years,
with the tax rate on taxable value ranging from 1.06% to 1.74% (Salt Lake County
Auditor, 2021). Over the period 2010-2018, the average property value of GB parcels was
42.8% higher than the average value of non-GB parcels, whereas the average property tax
rate levied on of GB parcels was as low as one-eighth of that of non-GB parcels (Table
B1).
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3.3.2 Mechanism by Which the FAA A↵ects Farmland Development
The classic urban spatial model suggests that the bid rent for urban land decreases with
the distance from a central business district; urban fringe at equilibrium is determined by
the coincidence of the bid rent and the so-called reservation rent, i.e., the rent associated
with agricultural use plus the opportunity cost of conversion capital (Alonso, 1964; Mills,
1967; Muth, 1969; Capozza and Helsley, 1989). The implementation of the FAA provides
an opportunity for the owners of qualifying land parcels to apply for GB designation,
which subsequently reduces the annual property tax rate levied on GB parcels. Therefore,
the tax relief under GB appraisal increases the opportunity cost of land conversion,
resulting in a delayed development of GB parcels.
On the flip side, the up-to-five-year rollback tax may undermine the goal of the FAA
policy. In the presence of the up-to-five-year rollback tax, the property owners of qual-
ifying agricultural parcels may not apply for GB designation if they expect to convert
their land to urban use within five years. Consequently, the parcels close to the urban
boundary would be less likely to be enrolled in GB. Since the most fertile soils are located
in peri-urban farmland (Seto and Kaufmann, 2003; Brinkley, 2012; Li et al., 2013), the
e↵ect of FAA policy on protecting high-productivity farmland is weakened.
The GB eligibility criteria complicate the relationship between the FAA policy and
control of urban growth.As mentioned previously, to be eligible for the GB tax relief, the
agricultural productivity of a parcel must surpass a certain threshold, typically 50% of
the county’s average productivity conditional on the subclassification of farmland (e.g.,
irrigated land, dry land, grazing land, orchard, meadow, etc.). Yet, the agricultural pro-
ductivity is positively correlated with a parcel’s reservation rent against farmland con-
version.Hence, it is conceptually ambiguous whether the e↵ect on farmland conservation
is by FAA policy alone or to variation in reservation rent, or both.
Allowing non-agricultural activities on GB parcel can generate two opposing e↵ects.
On the one hand, it motivates a rationale landowner to convert part of her GB parcel(s)
to urban use in order to maximize the present value of future land rents provided that
her entire land continues to qualify for the GB designation. On the other hand, the
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landowner can choose to retain her remaining land in agriculture now in order to develop
it as late as possible such that the entire parcel continues receiving GB tax relief. How
these two opposite forces interact in determining the e cacy of the FAA policy is an
empirical question, which depends on several di↵erent factors, such as the location of a
GB parcel, the conuty’s total qualifying area, and the per-acre tax reduction occurring
under GB.
3.3.3 Characteristics of Greenbelt versus Non-Greenbelt Parcels
Table 3.1 reports the mean characteristics of Salt Lake County’s GB and non-GB parcels
over the period 2010-2018 by major land use and development status. Panel A, column
1 presents the mean statistics of the entire groups of GB parcels, and Panel B presents
non-GB parcels. Columns 2-4 summarize characteristics of land parcels primarily in
agriculture; and columns 5-7 summarize similar characteristics of land parcel primarily
in non-agriculture. We see that agriculture is the dominant land use in both groups of
GB (69.6% as to the parcel average) and non-GB (66.5%) .
Table 3.1: Mean characteristics of Greenbelt and non-Greenbelt parcels by land
development status in Salt Lake County, Utah
Total Primarily in agriculture Primarily in non-agriculture
Total Developed Undeveloped Total Developed Undeveloped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: GreenBelt parcels
% parcel in agriculture 69.6 86.3 79.9 87.4 23.3 18.4 24.7
% parcel in urban 3.4 1.3 9.6 - 9.1 39.8 -
Distance from the boundary of urban core (miles) 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.7
EVI-based productivity 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
Does the parcel meet the land size and land use
criteria? (1 if yes) 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Area (acres) 29.9 25.8 58.2 20.7 41.2 23.7 46.4
No. of parcels 17,403 12,796 1,752 11,044 4,607 1,054 3,553
Total area converted to urban use (acres) 3,271.8 2,060.3 2,060.3 - 1,211.6 1,211.6 -
No. of parcels remained in GB after land development 2,277 1,459 - - 818 - -
Panel B: Non-GreenBelt parcels
% parcel in agriculture 66.5 87.6 68.9 88.9 18.7 12.0 21.5
% parcel in urban 5.2 1.2 19.3 - 14.1 48.5 -
Distance from the boundary of urban core (miles) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.6
EVI-based productivity 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
Does the parcel meet the land size and land use
criteria? (1 if yes) 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
Area (acres) 12.9 6.8 39.1 4.6 26.5 12.2 32.3
No. of parcels 166,537 115,500 7,346 108,154 51,037 14,853 36,184
Total area converted to urban use (acres) 21,702 8,934.6 8,934.6 - 12,767.4 12,767.4 -
Further, on average non-GB parcels are located closer to the boundary of the urban
core than GB parcels. The average distance of non-GB parcels from the urban boundary
is 0.264 miles as compared to 0.463 miles for GB parcels. This observation underpins our
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aforementioned hypothesis that, in the presence of the five-year rollback tax, land parcels
closer to the urban boundary are less likely to be enrolled in GB. Within either the GB
group or the non-GB group, land parcels which are closer to the urban boundary are
more likely to be developed (col. 3, 4, 6, and 7). This development pattern is consistent
the classic monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969), i.e., land
parcels closer to the urban core are typically associated with lower transportation costs
and more convenient access to industrial products and commercial services; consequently,
these parcels are more likely to be converted to urban use.
Roughly, about 90% of GB parcels meet the qualifying criteria on land size and land
use, whereas only 19% of non-GB parcels meet these two criteria. Given the large pool of
non-GB parcels in our data, if all these qualifying parcels attained the GB designation, it
would triple the number of existing GB parcels. The average EVI (Enhanced Vegetation
Index)-based land productivity of GB parcels (0.325) is higher than that of non-GB
parcels (0.263). Within both the GB and non-GB groups, parcels with higher land
productivity are less likely to be developed (col. 3, 4, 6, and 7). The findings are generally
consistent with the three criteria of GB eligibility and the hypothesis of the monocentric
city model, i.e., higher agricultural rent reduces the probability of development. Yet,
these observations reinforce the concerns about the ambiguous channel through which the
FAA policy takes e↵ect. In other words, can we simply attribute the e↵ect on farmland
conservation to the FAA alone?
Lastly, a comparison of GB parcels between the subgroups of primarily in agriculture
use and that primarily in non-agriculture use (col. 2 and 5, panel A) reveal that when
agriculture is not the major use, land parcels are typically characterized by a higher
urban proportion (9.11% versus 3.38% of major use), located farther from the urban core
(0.582 miles versus 0.420 of major use), much lower land productivity (0.119 versus 0.399
of major use), and a lower percent meeting the qualifying criteria on land size and land
use (88% versus 91% of major use).
3.4 Data
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3.4.1 Data Sources and structure
This study combines an array of comprehensive data for empirical analysis. One of the
primary data sources is the georeferenced, longitudinal property tax assessment data for
Salt Lake County over the period of 2008 - 201828 (Salt Lake County Assessor, 2019). The
data is parcel-level and contains inter alia the GB status, parcel location, and ownership
information for each year. When a parcel is sold or transferred, it may either be split into
smaller parcels, or merged with other parcels. We assume that a parcel is designated as
GB parcel as long as it contains any parcel that has GB status.
The second source of the data used in the study is the Cropland Data Layer (CDL) at
the 30m resolution from USDA for Salt Lake County from 2008 to 2018 (USDA-NASS,
2019). The CDL classifies land cover into multiple types of agricultural and developed
land. This study defines farmland as any types of cropland29 that is active or inactive
(i.e. idle cropland), as well as grassland30 used for grazing. Developed land is defined as
land that classified as open, low, medium, or high-density developed land31.
The third source of data is NASA’s 250m MODIS — EVI (Didan, K., 2015). EVI
serves as an indicator for crop productivity. It has been broadly applied in the literature
as an e↵ective predictor of crop productivity (Arvor et al., 2011; Son et al., 2014; Kouadio
et al., 2014; Lopresti et al., 2015). Other ancillary data includes the Salt Lake County zip
code information from the Utah Automated Geographic Reference Center (Automated
Geographic Reference Center, 2019). This shapefile has the location boundaries of all
Salt Lake County zip codes.
3.4.2 Data Processing
The presented study has entailed an extensive amount of raw data processing in order to
obtain the parcel-level panel data for the analysis. The first challenge in data processing
was to combine the multiple-year shapefiles obtained from assessor’s o ce into a single
shapefile with a consistent parcel identifier, while retaining the parcel information for each
year. To this end, we reconstructed to the 2008 land parcel boundaries while retaining the
information for each observation for each year. Moreover, ownership information in its
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raw form is unrecognizable by machines. To overcome this issue, we classified ownership
information using a string-searching algorithm — fuzzy matching32 disregarding capital
letters, spacing, and punctuation between words. In the end, we obtained the complete
and machine-readable ownership information.
Annual change in land use and crop type are compared year by year from 2008 - 2018
at the pixel-level to obtain the number of pixels corresponding urban conversion. This
pixel-level information is then aggregated to parcel-level, which allows us to calculate the
exact area of annual land use change from agriculture to urban for each parcel. This study
restricts analysis to parcels that are either farmland or developed land. We calculated
the closest distance of (the centroid of) each parcel to an urban core boundary (UCB)
to proxy for transportation cost, where urban core is defined as the medium- and high-
density developed land identified in CDL identification33. Distances changes over time as
the UCB varies from year to year.
To calculate the EVI-based annual crop productivity,the annual maximum EVI value
was extracted among the 16-days frequency EVI images for each and every year. Cloud
cover and aerosols are often a concern when using satellite data since they can bias
results. However, since the annual maximum EVI is used in the study, concern about
cloud cover concern is alleviated. In addition, EVI corrects some of the distortions in the
reflected light caused by air particles as well as ground cover below the vegetation(Earth
Observing System, 2021). Overlaying the CDL and EVI layers has allowed us to calculate
the average EVI value for each crop type and grassland each year. We further identify
parcels whose productivities are above the county average by comparing the EVI of each
parcel’s individual pixels with the annual average EVI value for each type of crop and
grassland each year.
3.4.3 Geographic Scope of Greenbelt Parcels
This study leverages a wide cross-sectional parcel-level (⇠ 20,000 parcels per year) and
long time-series (9 years from 2010 to 2018) dataset that accounts for all land-use changes
between agricultural and developed land in Salt Lake County with the aim of analyzing
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the causal e↵ect of GB designation on urban development. We find that the distance
of non-GB parcels from UCB remain relatively stable over time, with a slight decrease
from an average of 0.264 miles in 2011 to 0.251 miles in 2017 (figure B3). Meanwhile, the
mean distance from UCB of GB parcels increased from 0.459 miles in 2011 to 0.491 miles
in 2017. This increase may be attributable to the withdrawal of GB parcels from the
program that are closer to UCB,or to the enrollment of new GB parcels that are located
farther from UBC, or both. Our sample of parcels suggests that over 54.1%34 of the GB
parcels have benefited from the FAA tax relief. However, only 16.9% of the GB parcels
retained the GB status throughout the study period.
Figure 3.1 provides a snapshot of the study area’s GB and non-GB between 2010 and
2018. The figure shows that loss of farmland occurred on GB parcels, especially in the
northern and northwestern part of the County.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
To empirically examine the e↵ect of receiving GB designation on protecting farmland
from urban development, we fit our panel data to the following equation:
sinh
 1
Yit = GBit  +Xit✓ + µi +  pt + ✏it (2)
where Yit is the rate of change from farmland to developed land on parcel i between year
t and t + 1 (t = 2010, ..., 2017); GBit is a dummy variable indicating whether or not
parcel i receives GB designation in period t; Xit is a row vector of three time-varying
covariates — the closest distance of parcel i from the boundary of urban core, the parcel’s
EVI-based agricultural productivity measure, and a dummy variable as a proxy for the
Urban Farming Assessment Act (UFAA).
Distance and agricultural productivity are the key variables in the classical urban
spatial model, as they help determine whether a parcel is likely to be developed to urban
use. The inclusion of these two variables also help control the rollback tax channel and
the eligibility channel through which the GB policy may a↵ect farmland conversion, as
previously discussed in section 3.3.2. The UFAA, was designed to protect smaller urban
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farmland from development using a taxation approach similar to the FAA. The UFAA
allows parcels comprised of between two and five contiguous acres to be assessed based
on agricultural use value, provided that the land is actively devoted to urban farming
for at least two successive years immediately prior to the tax year and the land produces
greater than 50% of average production per acre, where “urban farming” refers to food
production and does not include cultivating food derived from an animal or grazing
(Urban Farming Assessment Act, 2012). The Act was initiated on January 1, 2013 and
only applies solely to Salt Lake County. In the absence of the information about whether
a parcel is assessed under the UFAA, we create a dummy variable indicating the UFAA
qualification for each parcel each year. Specifically, the dummy variable equals one if a)
year t is greater or equal to 2013, b) the parcel is actively devoted to urban farming for at
least two successive years immediately preceding time t, and c) the area of urban farming
in time t is between two and five contiguous acres in t. Thus, the e↵ect of the UFAA
on farmland conversion is jointly captured by this dummy variable and the EVI-based
agricultural productivity.
The term µi is a full set of parcel-level fixed e↵ects, which absorbs all parcel-specific,
time-invariant unobserved factors such as topography, soil quality, and some landowners’
characteristics (e.g., gender and education) that may be correlated with the enrollment
of GB designation. The term  pt is a set of ZIP-code-by-year indicators where the sub-
script p references the postal zip code, which non-parametrically absorbs all time-varying
unobservables such as socioeconomic and land use planning shocks that are common to
the GB e↵ects within a given postal zone. To a certain extent, the ZIP code-by-year
indicators also help capture unobserved neighborhood e↵ects in a postal zone. The term
✏it is the idiosyncratic error terms, clustered at parcel-level and are robust to potential
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
To correct the skewed distributions of Yit, we adopt the inverse hyperbolic sine trans-
formation, where the estimated coe cients are interpreted in the same way as with a
log-transformed dependent variable. This transformation yields results identical to those
using the logarithm for non-zero observations, while also handling the zeroes without
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crudely transforming of the data (Gibson et al., 2017; Li, 2019).
3.5.1 Identification
Of primary interest is the e↵ect of receiving GB designation, GBit, on farmland devel-
opment. In reality, however, one cannot observe the same parcel that does and does
not simultaneously attain to GB treatment. The best way to address this issue is to
find comparable counterfactuals and design a Neyman-Rubin causal model with fully
randomized or natural experiment data (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974), which is rare in
the social science. In the absence of this type of data, the present study relies upon
a quasi-natural experimental design by exploiting the panel structure of data using the
instrument variable (IV) approach. Implementation of the IV method helps address a
potential endogeneity problem commonly faced by a voluntary program. Under the FAA,
landowners voluntarily apply for GB designation. In the process of GB enrollment there
may exist some unobserved factors correlated with a landowner’s decision on farmland
development, resulting omitted-variable bias.
To address the potential endogeneity of GB designation, we estimate a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression35 in which the first-stage equation is specified as:
GBit = Zit  +Xit✓ + µi +  pt + ⇠it (3)
where Zit represents the instrument (dummy) variable for GB designation; indicating
whether parcel i satisfies the land-size and land-use criteria(henceforth GB Eligibility).
The terms Xit, µi, and  pt are defined the same way as in the second-stage main equation
(1), and ⇠it is the idiosyncratic error term.
Below we discuss the validity of the Zit instrument for identifying the causal ef-
fect of Greenbelt designation on farmland development based upon two fundamental
assumptions — monotonicity and the exclusion restriction — proposed by Angrist et al.
(1996). Monotonicity implies that (the probability of) receiving GB designation is a non-
decreasing function of GB Eligibility. Since GB Eligibility is the indicator for satisfying
the GB designation criteria, land parcels satisfying the criteria are, all else equal, more
49
likely to obtain GB designation. Consequently, our instrument is likely to satisfy the
monotonicity assumption.
The exclusion restriction requires that GB Eligibility’s e↵ect on farmland development
must strictly occur via the e↵ect of GB Eligibility on GB designation.Holding GB fixed,
a change in GB Eligibility will not a↵ect the conversion rate of agricultural land to urban
use. By definition, GB Eligibility is assigned the value of one if a parcel comprises at
least five acres in agriculture with the same ownership and has been actively devoted
to agriculture for at least the previous two successive years; assigned zero otherwise.
While it a↵ects the decision on GB designation, there is no theoretical basis or empirical
evidence suggesting that the GB Eligibility instrument directly a↵ects the reservation
rent for urban development.
The two fundamental assumptions discussed above constitute the core of the IV ap-
proach. The“stronger” the instrument (in explaining variations in GB designation), the
smaller the bias associated with violations of the assumptions(Angrist et al., 1996).
3.5.2 The Role of Allowing Non-Agriculture on a Greenbelt Parcel
To explore whether the FAA may be abused by allowing non-agriculture activities on
a GB parcel, equation 2 is modified in order to examine heterogeneity in GB e↵ect of
di↵erent GB parcels. Specifically, we classify the GB parcels in two groups. The first
group includes GB parcels comprised of not more than or equal to five acres farmland,
denoted as GBs. The second group consists of parcels with no less than five acres of
farmland, denoted as GBl. This classification creates two binary variables which equal
one if a parcel falls into the group and zero otherwise36. These two dummy variables GBs







it l +Xit✓ + µi +  pt + ✏it (4)
The associated first-stage equations for GBs and GBl are
GB
j
it = Zit  + Iit⌘ +Xit✓ + µi +  pt + ⇠it, j = s, l (5)
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where Iit is another dummy variable indicating whether the agricultural area of parcel
i is no more than five acres in year t. The binary variable Iit serves as an extra IV
instrumenting GBs and GBl, respectively.
The heterogeneity analysis in equations 4 and 5 allows for a test of a possible adverse
e↵ect of the FAA on farmland preservation. A statistically significant, positive point
estimate of GBl would support the hypothesis that landowners may abuse the tax relief
assessment and convert (at least) part of their GB parcel(s) to urban use. The analysis
also enables us to probe, to some extent, the counterfactual scenario in which this policy
“loophole” is fixed. The logic is that when a GB-designated parcels consist of no more
than five acres of farmland, a rationale landowner will not convert any farmland to urban
use if she prefers to continue receiving a tax relief for the parcel. Otherwise, the parcel
will become ineligible for GB designation and the landowner will face an up-to-five-year
rollback tax penalty. The no-more-than-five-acre of farmland restriction is presumed to
act as a constraint on a landowner’s land-use decision-making process in the GBs group,
which creates a counterfactural where the FAA policy prohibits owners of GB parcels from
converting any farmland to urban use or selling their land to developers. Admittedly,
prohibiting GB parcel conversion may also discourage property owners from enrolling
in the GB program to begin with. In the end, completely nailing down landowners’
decisions on GB enrollment is beyond the scope of this paper and can be a subject of
future research.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Does Utah’s FAA Preserve Farmland from Development?
Table 3.2 presents the results from the estimation of equations 2 and 3 using data from
all agricultural parcels in Salt Lake County over the period from 2010 - 2018. Results
in column 1 correspond to a pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) specification without
corrections for time fixed e↵ects and average parcel e↵ects. Column 2 reports results
from adding ZIP code-by-year fixed e↵ects. The specification in column 3 adds another
full set of parcel fixed e↵ects. F-tests reject the null hypothesis that the additional
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sets of fixed e↵ects are jointly equal to zero. Columns 4a through 6b in turn present the
corresponding 2SLS regression results, where the parameter estimates from the first-stage
regression are reported in columns 4a, 5a, and 6a and the parameter estimates from the
second-stage regression are reported in columns 4b, 5b, and 6b. Overall, the OLS and
the 2SLS regressions result in qualitatively similar estimates of the e↵ect of receiving GB
designation on farmland development.
As expected, the probability of receiving GB designation increases with GB Eligibility
at the 1% significance level across all three specifications (cols. 4a, 5a, and 6a). This
result confirms the monotonicity assumption for a valid IV, indicating that a parcel
satisfying the land-size and land-use criteria is more likely to enroll. The GB Eligibility
instrument exhibits strong explanatory power in explaining variations in whether a parcel
receives GB designation. The F-tests for significance of GB Eligibility in the first-stage
regression shows values ranging between 53,782 and 63,192, much higher than the level
of 10 typically suggested for rejecting weak instrument (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock
and Watson, 2008). This strong IV-GB correlation greatly reduces any potential bias
even though the exclusion restriction assumption is violated37 (Angrist et al., 1996). The
Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the GB designation dummy variable is
exogeneous with respect to the rate of farmland development at the 1% significance level
in the pooled regression, and at the 10% level when the parcel fixed e↵ects (and the ZIP
code-by-year fixed e↵ects) are included. This test result suggests that the 2SLS regression
is preferred to its OLS counterpart, although controlling for unobserved parcel-specific
permanent determinants of farmland development alone helps attenuate the extent of
endogeneity. Thus, the specification in columns 6a and 6b is the preferred model.As for
other factors a↵ecting GB designation in the first-stage regression (col. 6a), as anticipated
parcels with a higher EVI-based agricultural productivities are more likely to receive GB
designation, since land productivity38 is a necessary criterion for designation. Moreover,
a parcel located closer to UCB is less likely to be a GB parcel, which reinforces our
hypothesis about the role of the five-year rollback tax in a↵ecting the landowner’s GB
enrollment decision.
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As shown in column 6b, receiving GB designation reduces the rate of farmland devel-
opment by approximately 1.3% per annum at the 5% level of significance, ceteris paribus.
This result suggests that the FAA indeed helps protect farmland from urban development.
The rate of farmland conversion also decreases with distance from a UCB at the 1% sig-
nificance level. This finding is consistent with the distance assumption of a monocentric
city model, i.e., the farther a parcel is located from the city center, the lower its bid rent
for urban land. This in turn lowers the likelihood of the bid rent exceeding a landowner’s
reservation rent that would otherwise trigger conversion to urban use. In contrast, the
rate of farmland development increases with the EVI-based agricultural productivity. We
attribute this counterintuitive result to the fact that modern communities tend to set-
tle on fertile land and consequently urban centers emerge there (Brinkley, 2012; Bryce,
2016). In other words, the impetus for urban development often outweights the perceived
value of preserving farmland fertility. Similar findings have been reported by Seto and
Kaufmann (2003) and Li et al. (2013).
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Figure 3.1: Farmland Change on GB and Non-GB parcels between 2010 to 2018
Note: Land use change information is derived from CDL.The 2018 GB locations are obtained from Salt
Lake County’s assessor o ce.
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Table 3.2: Estimated e↵ects of GB designation on all types of agriculture to urban conversions
Dependent variable:
% Ag to D GB % Ag to D GB % Ag to D GB % Ag to D
OLS OLS OLS First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
GreenBelt  0.194⇤⇤⇤  0.191⇤⇤⇤  0.001  0.848⇤⇤⇤  0.777⇤⇤⇤  0.013⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.016) (0.080) (0.006)
GB Eligibility 0.335⇤⇤⇤ 0.332⇤⇤⇤ 0.634⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.019) (0.009)
Distance (mile)  0.115⇤⇤⇤  0.114⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤  0.035⇤⇤⇤  0.087⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤  0.091⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002)
Productivity  0.021⇤⇤⇤ 0.007 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤ 0.004 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.029 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.031) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.029) (0.002) (0.003)
UFAA  0.248⇤⇤⇤  0.220⇤⇤⇤  0.029⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤  0.136⇤⇤⇤ 0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.116⇤⇤⇤  0.012  0.030⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.008)
Constant 0.347⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.394⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Parcel FE No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Year x ZIP FE No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak inst.(F-stat) - - - 53327 - 13635 - 62588 -
Weak inst.(p-val) - - - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ -
Wu-Hausman(p-val) - - - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - 0.06048⇤ -
Observations 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940
R2 0.061 0.062 0.005 0.235 0.039 0.233 0.041 0.340 0.005
F test (p-val) - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤
F test (F-stat) - 2.2267 6.7779 - - 1.3838 2.9362 8.4989 8.8669
Mean of dep. variable 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.095 0.289 0.095 0.289 0.095 0.289
Note: The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformed rate of farmland conversion for model 1,2,3, and all the second stage models. This
measures the rate of conversion to all kinds of developed land (open, low, medium, and high density). The dependent variable for all the first stage is GB
designation. Specifications in columns 1, 4a, and 4b are the pooled regressions, columns 2, 5a, and 5b include ZIP code by year fixed e↵ects, and columns 3, 6a,
and 6b include parcel and ZIP code by period fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at parcel-level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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3.6.2 Does Allowing Non-Agricultural activities on a Greenbelt Parcel Cause for Concern?
To examine whether landowners may abuse GB tax relief through fostering non-agricultural
activities on a GB parcels, we conduct a heterogeneity analysis depicted in equations 4
and 5, which distinguishes GB parcels comprised of more than five acres of farmland
from GB parcels comprised of less than or equal to five acres. The estimation results are
reported in Table 3.3, where columns 1a and 1b, respectively, correspond to the two first-
stage regression for GBs and GBl, and column 1c presents the point estimates obtained
from the second-stage regression.
Consistent with the IV validity test reported in Table 3.2, the F-tests for the signif-
icance of the two instruments are strongly correlated with GBs and GBl, respectively,
with a joint F-statistic values of 52,228 (col. 1a) and 2,279 (col. 1b). The Wu-Hausman
tests reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for both GB variables at the 1% significance
level. Point estimates of all variables in the first-stage regressions are qualitatively and
quantitatively consistent with our expectations, except the statistically significant nega-
tive estimate of GB Eligibility in column 1b. This result implies that after controlling for
all other covariates, there is no correlation between larger parcels satisfying the land-use
and land-size criteria and the probability of their enrollment in the GB program.
Turning to the second-stage regression corresponding to these first-stage regressions
(column 1c), the point estimate of GBs is nearly identical to the overall GB estimate
reported in column 6b of Table 2, whereas the coe cient estimate of GBl is positive at
the 1% significance level. The tax reduction incentive associated with GB designation
tends to encourage owners of GB parcels with agricultural areas exceeding 5 acres to
develop farmland at an annual rate of 24.2%. This rate is of a much higher magnitude
than the negative e↵ect (-1.3%) of GBs on urban development. The result a rms the
possible abuse of GB tax relief on larger parcels when landowners are permitted to convert
portions of their GB parcels to non-agricultural use without impairing the eligibility of
maintaining GB designation. The finding is likewise supported by the data itself: out of
5,679 (parcel-year) GBl observations, urban development occurred on 1,281 parcels, with
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneity GB ATE on primary use vs secondary use farmland
Dependent variable:
GBs GBl % AgtoD GB(PriAg) GB(NPriAg) % AgtoD
First stage First stage Second stage First stage First stage Second stage









GB Eligibility 0.635⇤⇤⇤ 0.164⇤⇤⇤ 0.471⇤⇤⇤ 0.163⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)




Distance (mile) 0.004⇤⇤  0.002⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤  0.001  0.040⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Productivity 0.005⇤⇤⇤  0.030⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤  0.004⇤⇤⇤  0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
UFAA  0.010  0.011  0.023⇤⇤⇤  0.003  0.009  0.034⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.016)
Parcel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak inst(F-stat) 52230 2281 - 423.67 6660.1 -
Weak inst(p-val) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ -
Wu-Hausman(p-val) 0.01871⇤⇤ 3.827e   15⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ -
Observations 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940
R2 0.462 0.057 0.001 0.221 0.103 0.001
Mean of dep. variable 0.064 0.031 0.289 0.064 0.031 0.289
Note: The dependent variable for the first stage (column 1a) is GB parcels that agriculture acre is no more
than 5, whereas the dependent variable for the first stage (column 1b) is GB parcels that agriculture acre
is more than 5. The dependent variable for the first stage (column 2a) is GB parcels that are primarily
in agricultural use, whereas the dependent variable for the first stage (column 2b) is GB parcels that
are primarily in non-agricultural use. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformed
rate of urban conversion measured in acre in the second stage model presented in column 1c and 2c.
This measures the conversion to all kinds of developed land (open, low, medium, and high density).
All specifications include parcel and ZIP code by year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at parcel-level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05;
⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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more than 83% of these parcels remained in GB designation after land use conversion.
The total developed area on GBl parcels is also nontrivial; it accounts for 67% of the
total area (3,272 acres) converted from agriculture to urban use on all GB parcels over
the entire study period. In contrast, owners of smaller GB parcels with less agricultural
area are limited in their ability to abuse this tax-relief contingency.
For further validation, we conduct another round of heterogeneity analysis by distin-
guishing GB parcels with primary agricultural use from GB parcels with primary non-
agricultural use, and by allowing the GB e↵ect on farmland conversion to vary across
the two groups. The estimation results are reported in columns 2a–2c of Table 3.3. As
anticipated, GB designation on primarily agricultural parcels increases the rate at which
a landowner develops at least a portion of her farmland by approximately 0.47% per
annum, whereas GB designation on primarily non-agricultural parcels reduces the con-
version rate by 1.39%. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. It can
therefore can be plausibly argued that an owner of a GB parcels with a higher percentage
of farmland is more likely abusing the law by either converting a portion of their land to
urban use or selling some of their property to land developers. This findings underpins
the concerns about allowing agriculture to be secondary use under FAA in a di↵erent
perspective.
3.6.3 Robustness Checks
Tables B2 and B3 in Appendix 4.7 present the results of several robustness checks based
on the two preferred specifications in Tables 3.2 (cols. 6a and 6b) and 3.3 (cols. 1a–1c).
In addition to the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the annual conversion rate
from farmland to urban use, we consider a 2SLS linear probability model in which the
outcome variable in the second-stage equation takes the value of one if urban development
occurred on a given parcel, zero otherwise. Since this model shares the same first-stage
regression as in column 5b of Table 3.2 and columns 1a and 1b of Table 3.3, we only report
the regression results of the second-stage equations 2 and 4 in columns 1 and 2 of Table
B2 respectively. The 2SLS linear probability models produce similar estimates of the GB
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e↵ects on farmland development as the results presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, implying
that the estimated GB e↵ects are robust to the measure of farmland development.
A related robustness check is to examine whether the estimated GB e↵ects are sen-
sitive to the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which controls for skewed farmland
conversion rate. To this end, we re-estimated the second-stage equations 2 and 4 using
two alternative outcome variables. One is the log-transformed farmland conversion rate
by adding one to all outcome variables (cols. 3 and 4 of table B2). The other outcome
variable is the farmland conversion rate without any transformation (cols. 5 and 6 of
table B2). Keeping the farmland conversion rate in its original form slightly lowers the
probability of rejecting the null hypotheses of a zero overall GB estimate and a zero
GBs estimate from a 95% confidence level to a 90% confidence level, but it does not
undermine the main conclusion drawn from the preceding discussion. As anticipated,
log-transforming the outcome variable produces nearly identical estimates to those ob-
tained using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Consequently, we conclude that
the estimated GB e↵ects are robust to the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation; cor-
recting the skewed distribution of farmland conversion rate helps increase the statistical
power of the analysis. These results suggest that our results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are
robust to di↵erent forms of the dependent variables.
Another concern is whether there is a nonlinear e↵ect of distance from the UCB on
farmland development. To examine the potential nonlinearity, we include a squared term
of distance in the estimation of equations 2-3 and 4-5 , respectively, and report the second-
stage regression results in columns 2 and 5 of Table B3. The result supports a U-shaped
relationship between distance and farmland development, yet it does not impair the
estimation results obtained from the previous section. The rate of farmland conversion
decreases with distance until the distance reaches 5.50 miles in the estimation of the
overall GB e↵ect and reaches 4.75 miles when heterogenous GB e↵ects are considered.
Since the overall sample mean of distance from UCB is 0.283 miles (Table B5 of the
Appendix 4.7 ), most land parcels fall well within the distance intervals where the rate of
farmland conversion is decreasing. Moreover, including an extra covariate that captures
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the e↵ect of squared distance from UCB does not change the signs or significance of our
previous results.
Finally, we examined whether the estimated GB e↵ects are sensitive to the inclusion
of the UFAA dummy. For this purpose, we re-estimated the equations 2-3 and 4-5 by
removing the UFAA dummy and report the results in columns 1a-2c of Table B4. The
estimated GB e↵ects are very robust regardless of whether the UFAA e↵ects are captured
in the model. Furthermore, we also re-estimated the equations 2-3 and 4-5 by using the
UFAA dummy that accounted for EVI productivity and report the results in columns
3a-4c of Table B4. The estimated GB e↵ects, again, are qualitatively similar regardless
of which UFAA variables are used in the model.
3.7 The Magnitude of the FAA E↵ect and Its Policy Implications
The proceeding heterogeneity analysis indicates that receiving GB designation on parcels
with no more than five acres of agricultural area helps protect farmland from urban de-
velopment, whereas the opposite is true for GB parcels having more than five agricultural
acres. This section evaluates the magnitude of the estimated FAA e↵ects by decomposing
the conversion rate of farmland to urban use. Further, it discusses the policy implications
of the analysis.
Table 3.4: The magnitude of the regulation e↵ects and its composition
Contribution %
Regulation e↵ects Mean 95% Confidence Interval
(1) (2) (3a) (3b)
GB
s -0.00082 -0.28% -0.39% -0.17%
GB
l 0.0075 2.59% 2.51% 2.67%
Productivity 0.015 5.33% 5.16% 5.50%
Distance -0.0094 -3.26% -3.55% -2.97%
UFAA -0.00015 -0.05% -0.087% -0.013%




Table 3.4 develops the measure of the magnitude of the FAA e↵ects over the entire
study period 2010-2018. Column 1 presents the estimated e↵ects of various factors on
farmland development. These e↵ects are calculated by multiplying the overall sample
mean of each explanatory variable by the relevant coe cient estimate from the specifi-
cation in columns 1c of Table 3.3. The last row of column 1 reports the mean value of
sinh
 1
Yit (i.e., the dependent variable in Equation 3), representing the aggregate mea-
sure of the farmland conversion rate. Subtracting the e↵ects of GBs, GBl, EVI-based
agricultural productivity, distance from UCB, and ZIP code-by-period fixed e↵ects from
mean value of sinh 1Yit yields the parcel fixed e↵ects (the second-to-last row of column
1). Column 2 reports the normalized factor e↵ects by dividing the respective entries by
the column’s last row. These e↵ects measure the relative contribution of respective fac-
tors to agricultural development. Column 3 lists the respective 95% confidence interval
of the normalized e↵ects.
The calculations reveal that the average annual rate of farmland development is 0.289
units, where 0.289 is the overall sample average of sinh 1Yit (Table B5 of the Appendix
4.7). This number translates to an average annual conversion rate of 32.6% (Table B5 of
the Appendix 4.7). Table 3.4 also reveals that, the FAA protects GBs parcels from urban
development at a normalized rate of only -0.28% of the total farmland conversion. The
95% confidence interval of this estimate is [-0.39%, -0.17%]. This policy e↵ect on GBs is,
however, entirely o↵set by the adverse e↵ect of GB designation via the encouragement
of GBl landowners to convert portions of their land to urban use. This adverse e↵ect
accounts for 2.59% [2.51%, 2.67%] of the total farmland conversion. Transitional shocks
common to the conversion of farmland within the same postal zone are the major factor
slowing down farmland development. Without these shocks, the annual rate of farmland
development would have been 0.395 units, 40.95% [40.87%,41.03%] higher than the actual
conversion rate. In comparison, the unobserved time-invariant parcel fixed e↵ects are the
dominant contributor to farmland development, accounting for 1.366 times the actual
conversion rate.
Breaking down the decomposition analysis by year illuminates the trend of the FAA
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Figure 3.2: Trend of the magnitude of the FAA e↵ects, 2010-2018
Note: The primary vertical axis at the right side measures the line chart of the normalized factor e↵ect
each year. The secondary vertical axis at the left side measures the bar chart of the mean value of sinhYit
each period. The residual is composed of parcel fixed e↵ects and ZIP code-by-period fixed e↵ects.
e↵ect on farmland development. As shown in Figure 3.2, the relative contribution of the
FAA to the preservation of GBs parcels is generally small, ranging from 0.09% to 6.81%
per annum over the study period 2010-2018. In contrast, the normalized adverse e↵ect of
GB appraisal on GBl parcels had rapidly increased from 0.64% in 2010-2011 to 33.28%
in 2017-2018, reaching its highest value of 72.62% in the period 2015-2016. This finding
supports our earlier argument that the FAA policy has been increasingly abused by the
owners of GBl parcels despite a steady decline in the overall conversion rate of farmland
to development. The finding supports the growing accusations of the misuse of the FAA
(Farm Progress, 2016; Davidson, 2020; Brown, 2017). The FAA regulation’s “loophole”
therefore poses justifiable concerns to the design of the state’s taxation policy to preserve
farmland.
In concert with the overall decline in the farmland conversion rate is the decreasing
normalized residual e↵ect, which is composed of parcel and ZIP code-by-period fixed ef-
fects to capturing the socioeconomic and political-policy unobservables. An examination
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of the evolution of the farmland development in the state suggests a trend of urban sprawl
in counties adjacent to Salt Lake County (i.e., Utah and Davis counties) over the period
2011-2016 (Yang et al., 2018), which helps release the pressure of urban development in
Salt Lake County. These results manifest the importance of sociopolitical circumstances
in protecting farmland from urbanization and is in line with the findings of Alterman
(1997), Jacobs (1999), and Li (2019) with respect to farmland protection policies in mul-
tiple countries, e.g. the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
France, Sweden, Israel, Japan, and China.
This study’s findings of this study have important implications for the recent and
ongoing taxation-based farmland protection legislation, such as the Urban Farming As-
sessment Act (UFAA) passed by the Utah legislature in 2012. Similar to the FAA, the
UFAA allows parcels in Salt Lake County comprised of between two and five acres to
attain GB designation based upon agricultural use value if the land is used to grow food
crops and as long as production is greater than 50% of average production for similar
land (Urban Farming Assessment Act, 2012). The UFAA was recently amended to lower
the minimum requirement for parcel size from two contiguous acres to one contiguous
acre (Urban Farming Assessment Act Amendments, 2019). It has also been recommended
that state and county legislators seek to expand the UFAA to include Utah County (Utah
County Agriculture Toolbox, 2021), the second-most populous county in Utah after Salt
Lake County in Utah. To gain a clear understanding of the e↵ectiveness of these poli-
cies, it is crucial to conduct a systematic, rigorous analysis to capture the joint e↵ects of
requirements for land use and the minimum acreage, the gap between the use value and
the market value, and the maximum number of years being subject to the rollback tax.
3.8 Conclusions
Urban sprawl and population growth contributed to the displacement of a significant
portion of peri-urban farmland in Salt Lake County year by year. This paper investigates
the e↵ectiveness of the Utah’s Farmland Assessment Act (FAA) from 2010 -2018 that
provides a “GreenBelt” (GB) tax-relief incentive to Salt Lake County landowners, with
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the goal of preserving peri-urban farmland. We find that the annual conversion rate of
GB designated farmland to urban development is approximately 1.3% lower than the
conversion rate on non-GB parcels, which translate into an approximate 850 acres of
farmland preserved each year in Salt Lake County. However, the GB e↵ects on farmland
protection are concentrated on GB parcels with no more than five acres agricultural
area, five acres being the minimum land-size necessary for GB designation, with some
exceptions. In contrast, the GB tax break tends to incentivize urban development on
GB parcels with larger than five acres devoted to agricultural production, with an annual
conversion rate roughly 24% higher than that of non-GB parcels. This adverse e↵ect
entirely counteracts the positive GB e↵ect on farmland preservation in magnitude. These
findings are drawn upon a rigorous quasi-experimental research design. The estimated
GB e↵ects are robust across a number of di↵erent specifications.
This study contributes to the ongoing debate concerning taxation-based farmland
protection legislation in Utah. Despite the ease of implementation of the FAA policy,
tracking land use and maintaining parcel records are complicated tasks. This paper’s
findings support the growing concerns about a policy “loophole” that permits agriculture
to be a secondary use of a GB parcel. Moreover, taxation policy shifts the tax burden
from agricultural landowners to urban landowners. The latter end up paying a higher tax
toward the preservation of farmland — a distributional e↵ect that should be considered in
public policy decision making. How to encourage participation of landowners in the GB
program also merits discussion. In our sample, there are 47,550 parcel-year observations
that qualified for GB designation during the study period, yet only 37% of the qualifying
parcels actually enrolled in the GB program. Whether amending the current FAA or
designing a new policy, policymakers must balance the tradeo↵ between encouraging GB
participation among landowners while at the same time preventing them from abusing
the tax break provision.
Our analysis has certain limitations. Due to data constraints, it does not control
for other farmland protection regulations, such as agricultural zoning or purchase of
development right program. Yet it is not a prime concern because the preferential tax
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assessment is the dominant policy in Utah. Further, although we employ a heterogenous
analysis to explore possible adverse e↵ects of the FAA, the estimates resulting from this
analysis should be interpreted with caution due to the lack of actual counterfactuals.
Nevertheless, this paper provides empirical evidence for possibly unintended e↵ects of
the FAA as well as the Act’s potential for preserving farmland from urbanization given
that the criteria for GB designation are strictly defined.
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Chapter 4
Covid-19 Shelter-in-Place and its Repercussion on Air Quality
4.1 Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to investigates the unintended consequences of
COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place (SP) on air quality in the United States on a county and
weekly scale. A comprehensive database of COVID-19 policies and air quality measures
has been complied for counties in all 50 states. According to the findings of this study,
having a Shelter-in-Place order increased the likelihood of having air quality falling into
the “Good” category by 1.012 percent when accounting for both seasonality in air quality
and the endogeneity of the SP order. The results are consistent across di↵erent air quality
measures and are robust to various model specifications and empirical methodologies.
4.2 Introduction
Since the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on
human behavior. The novel and highly transmissible virus spread across the world,
leaving continents and countries in state of uncertainty. In the United States, a Shelter-
in-Place (SP) order was imposed with the ultimate goal of reducing or slowing the spread
of the virus by limiting human interaction. Because air quality is highly dependent
on human activities (IARC Working Group, 2016; World Health Organization, 2021),
evaluating the causality of the SP order on air quality becomes possible. An array of
studies on the e↵ect of the SP order suggests that SP order has caused negative impacts
on Americans’ mental health (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020), employment (Beland et al.,
2020), well-being (Brodeur et al., 2021a), and domestic violence (Leslie and Wilson,
2020).
Less attention was paid to the potential positive impact of COVID-19 due to the SP
order or COVID-19 in general. This paper investigates one of the positive externalities of
the SP order on air quality. The rationale is that human activities are the primary source
of air pollution; thus, reducing human activities is expected to result in improved air
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quality. As suggested in figure 4.1, air quality measured by percentage of days falls into
category of “Good” Air Quality Index (AQI) in 2020 is higher than the 5-year average.
However, the margin of the di↵erence widens from March to May (as evidenced visually),
which could be attributed to the SP order in place at that time. Later of the year, in
June, when the majority of states and counties lifted the SP order, the margin of the
di↵erence of percentage “Good” AQI shrinks and, at times, becomes smaller than when
the SP order is not in e↵ect (before March). As a result, can we attribute the variation
in air quality to the SP order? This paper uses an empirical approach to investigate the
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Figure 4.1: Air quality and Shelter-in-Place
Because the purpose of this study is to investigate the causal e↵ect of the SP order
on air quality, a di↵erence-in-di↵erences approach is employed in the quasi-experimental
setting, which a county is designated as the treated during the period when a SP order is
in place. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the e↵ect of SP order on air quality as
measured by the Air Quality Index (AQI). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
uses the AQI to report air quality on a scale of 0 to 500. The lower the value, the better
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the air quality. And the index’s classification corresponds to di↵erent levels of health
concern.
There are several recent studies evaluate a similar policy that has been implemented
in various parts of the world or on a global scale. He et al. (2020) provides evidence that
the lockdown policy in China reduced AQI by 19.84 points and PM2.5 by 14.07 µg m 3
when compared to the control group. Dang and Trinh (2021) examined 164 countries
before and after the lockdown using Regression Discontinuity Design approach and found
that PM2.5 and NO2 decreased by 5% and 4%, respectively. Lenzen et al. (2020) employs
the input-output model to determine reductions in greenhouse gas, PM2.5, and other air
pollutants in 38 regions worldwide. Venter et al. (2020) examined 34 counties and found
that the concentration of PM2.5 and NO2 have decreased by 31% and 60%, respectively.
Perhaps Brodeur et al. (2021b) presents a work that is most relevant to this study;
specifically, the authors find consistent results on PM2.5 in the context of United States
with the ’Safer-at-Home’ policy. Meanwhile, Almond et al. (2020) find that Covid-19 had
ambiguous e↵ects on China’s air quality, with evidence near the pandemic’s epicenter,
Hubei province.
In several aspects, the present study contributes to the emerging literature. First, it
employs the AQI established by the EPA to communicate easy-to-understand daily air
quality to the public, and it accounts for seasonality in air quality in the unobservables
when assessing the impact in the United States. Second, this study controls for an
extensive set of COVID-19 policies implemented at the county and/or state levels. Third,
this study addresses the endogeneity associated with the SP order by employing a two-
stage least square. Finally, it investigates not only the e↵ect when a SP order in place,
but also the e↵ect after the SP order is lifted. This paper finds evidence that the SP
order have a positive e↵ect on the percent of good air quality. In particular, a county
with the SP order was 1.012 percent more likely to have a Good AQI day in a week on
average.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The data used in the study is pre-
sented in the section 4.3. The identification and methods are described in section 4.4.
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The estimated results are discussed in section 4.5. Finally, section 4.7 concludes.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Air quality
The station-based AQI provided by AirNow is used in the study to examine the relation-
ship of COVID-19 SP order on air quality. The index takes into accounts for the 5 majors
pollutants regulated by the Clean Air Act (i.e. Ground-level ozone, Particle pollution,
Carbon monoxide, Sulfur dioxide, and Nitrogen dioxide) in accordance with a standard
set by the EPA to protect public health. AQI provides a more comprehensive view of
air quality and the impact on human health compared to individual pollutants. Besides,
the dominant air pollutant varies greatly from region to region and throughout the year
(Amann et al., 2013; Li et al., 2020). As a result, using a single pollutant does not provide
a complete picture of the e↵ect. The AQI is divided into 6 categories (Good, Moderate,
Unhealthy for Sensitive Groups, Unhealthy, Very Unhealthy, Hazardous), with the break-
points determined by a review of the health e↵ects evidence (EPA AirNow, 2021).
This study constructed the percentage of days in a week and in a month that falls
into the category of “Good” AQI (% Good AQI) as the outcome variable. The “Good”
category is the most stringent, indicating that the air quality poses little or no risk
to health and that it is a great day to be active outside. Another reason to use the
% Good AQI as the main outcome variable is that AQI is a daily measure, because
taking the mean of the daily measure at the weekly or monthly level could average out
any measurable e↵ect. Meanwhile, mean AQI is also used as an alternative outcome
variable despite the fact that this outcome variable might be biased.
Air pollution can be seasonal (Peng et al., 2005), as evident in figure C1. To avoid
results driven by seasonality, air quality data prior to 2020 and between 2010 to 2019 is
included in the analysis to attempt to capture seasonality in the unobservables via fixed
e↵ects in panel data modeling. Another potential concern about the station-based air
AQI’s representativeness is that it covers slightly more than one-third of all the counties
in the United States. This concern, however, can be assured such that the selection of
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EPA air monitoring sites is based on a Monitoring Network Design (Ra↵use et al., 2007).
In essence, areas with highest concentrations of population within a region are prioritized
for monitoring. A focus is also placed on densely populated areas and/or areas with
projected future development.
4.3.2 Comprehensive COVID-19 related policies
The SP order is the key variable of interest in this study; to control of the potential
confounding e↵ect from other COVID-19 policies, this study includes a comprehensive
set of other COVID-19 related policies at the county and state levels. All COVID-19
related policies are obtained from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
COVID-19 surveillance data for all 50 states in the United States from the start of the
COVID-19 pendemic to the end of year in 2020. The dataset is downloaded on January
23, 2021 under the CDC surveillance data portal39. Because of its comprehansiveness,
the dataset for COVID-19 policies provided by CDC is used in this study. The dataset
records 23 county-level and 48 state-level COVID-19 policies. Using this dataset, dummy
variables for all the COVID-19 policy at the county- and state-level at the given time
period are created to control for any confounding e↵ect from COVID-19 policy other than
the SP order.
According to the data, the first statewide SP order was taken place in California
on March 19, 2020, while the first countywide SP order was issued in several Bay Area’s
Californian counties on March 17, 2020. The majority of states and counties implemented
SP order in March and most counties in the United States were in SP order for less than
8 weeks on average, according to the data. California is the only state with a SP order in
place until the end of 2020. For the analysis, an array of COVID-19 policies dummies is
constructed, with a value of 1 in the period when the policies were in place and a value
of 0 in the period when the policies were not in place.
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4.3.3 Per capita COVID-19 cases and deaths
It is reasonable to assume that COVID-19 cases and deaths discourage human activity
because there is uncertainty about how a novel virus will a↵ect di↵erent people. As a
result, the per capita COVID-19 cases and deaths are constructed to control for this e↵ect
in the per capita basis. The population estimate at the county-level in 2019 is obtained
from US Census. Furthermore, the nature of any COVID-19 policies is to reduce the
virus spread and/or to “flatten-the-curve”; therefore, it is also reasonable to include the
number of COVID-19 cases and deaths as determining factors in explaining the SP order’s
implementation.























































Figure 4.2: COVID-19 case and death and SP order by political party
The Democratic party and the Republican party are the two major political parties
in the United States. Political parties and their influence on public policies are well
evidenced (Cox and Mccubbins, 2007; Snowberg et al., 2007). Precinct-level presidential
election data in 2020 is gathered to account for the political party influence in the adoption
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of the SP order. The data is available at https://github.com/TheUpshot/presidential-
precinct-map-2020. The data contains the number of votes cast for Joseph Biden and
Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election. A county’s political party designation
is determined by a majority votes (> 50%) that are at the precinct-level aggregated to
the county-level.
Figure 4.2 summarizes the major explaining variables. COVID-19 cases has an in-
creasing trend for both Democratic and Republican counties in the entire studied period,
as illustrated (figure 4.2). It is worth noting that the number of COVID-19 cases is indeed
dependent to the number of people tested, whereas the number of COVID-19 deaths is
not. The number of counties with the SP order at various time by political parties is also
shown. There are more Republican counties with the SP order than Democratic counties;
however, this does not imply Republican counties are more likely to have the SP order.
It can simply be explained by the fact that there are more Republican counties. Another
point to note is that even though most counties lifted the SP order in June and July,
more Democratic counties still have it. In July, the number of per capita COVID-19 cases
and deaths for the two parties coincided, then Republican counties took o↵ with a higher
average value in both measures. The discussion will end here because the e↵ectiveness of
the SP order on the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths is not the focus of this study.
Table 4.1: Top 10 counties based on per-10,000 COVID-19 case in Jan 2020 - Oct 2020
County Party Shelter-in-Place (SP)/ Average AQI % of Good AQI Case per 10,000 Death Per 10,000
Stay At Home Order SP / no SP SP / no SP SP / no SP SP / no SP
Rockland, NY Dem. Statewide 34.5 / 37.8 100 / 89.7 258.1/ 43.4 5.8/ 0.02
Ford, KS Rep. Statewide 15.7 / 23.8 100 / 96.7 180.9/ 57.4 1.2/ 0.3
Woodbury, IA Rep. - 29.0 94.5 12.0 0.2
Nassau, NY Dem. Statewide 16.6 / 23.4 100 / 95.6 148.7/ 34.2 1.1 / 0.005
Westchester, NY Dem. Statewide 38.1 / 40.8 100 / 83.5 140.2 / 31.3 4.0 / 0.02
Santa Cruz, AZ Dem. - 36.0 76.9 127.6 2.7
Black Hawk, IA Rep. - 36.9 81.2 84.5 2.0
Liberty FL Rep. Statewide 40.7 / 27.9 96.7 / 100 122.1/ 44.9 0.6 / 1.5
Su↵olk, NY Rep. Statewide 39.6 / 46.6 98.8 / 71.9 119.6 / 28.3 0.6 / 0.03
Orange, NY Rep. Statewide 39.4 / 36.9 94.6 / 91.8 110.2 / 11.3 11.2 / 0.03
Note: This table presents the mean value for average AQI, % of Good AQI, Case per 1,000, and Death per 1,000 that are with and without
the SP order.
Table 4.1 presents the numerical summary of the outcome and major explaining vari-
ables for the top ten counties based on per 10,000 COVID-19 cases. Six of the counties
are Republican; most have better air quality with the SP order measured by AQI; all but
one have better air quality with the SP order measured by percentage of Good AQI; all
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have higher rate of COVID-19 cases when the SP order was in e↵ect; and all but one
have higher rate of COVID-19 deaths when the SP order was not in e↵ect.
4.4 Identification Strategy
One way to identify the causal e↵ect of SP order on air quality is to compare the air qual-
ity in counties with and without the SP order in a di↵erence-in-di↵erences or event study
framework. One potential concern could be a lag e↵ect in SP order on air quality. How-
ever, using a weekly percentage and a monthly percentage of good AQI as the outcome
variables remigrate such a concern. The following linear instrumental panel fixed-e↵ects
model in a di↵erence-in-di↵erences framework with the following specification is used to
investigate the causal impact of SP order on air quality, where equation 6 is as illustrated:
yct = SPct  + (Dem
2020
c ⇥COVIDct) +Xct + ✓c + !st + ✏ct (6)
where yct represents the percentage of Good AQI at the county-level in time t, SPct takes
the value of 1 if there is a SP order at the county- or/and state-level for a county, c, in
period t and 0 otherwise. Demc is a proxy for Democratic party a liation for a county
that takes a value of 1 if at least 50% of the votes are cast for Joe Biden in the 2020
presidential election and 0 otherwise; and COVIDct is a vector composed of per capita
COVID-19 cases and deaths. The interaction term takes the value of 0 in year other
than 2020 as there is no COVID-19 case or death prior to 2020. To account for the e↵ect
from other COVID-19 policies and the endogeneity of the SP order, an extensive set of
county- and state-level COVID-19 policies and the per capita COVID-19 case and death,
Xct, are included.  ,  , and   are the parameters to be estimated.✓c, !st and  y capture
the county and state by period fixed e↵ects respectively. Finally, ✏ct are the clustered
idiosyncratic errors at the county-level that are robust to both heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation.
To address the potential endogeniety of the SP order, a two-stage least squares (2SLS)
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regression in which the first-stage equation is specified as:
SPct = (Popc ⇥Week2020ct )↵+ (Dem2020c ⇥COVIDct) +Xct + ✓c + !st + µct (7)
where Popc ⇥ Week2020ct are the instrumental variables (IVs) used to predict for a SP
order in e↵ect, in which it is the interaction of population in a county,c, at period, t,with
the vector of dummy variables for week 12, 13, 14, and 15, respectively, in 2020. The
terms Dem2020c ⇥COVIDct, Xct, ✓c, and !st are defined the same way as in the second-
stage in main equation 6, and µct is the idiosyncratic error term. Most counties/states
began implementing the SP order in week 12 and the last county/state that implemented
the SP order was in week 15 of 2020. Interacting the week dummies with population
generated the weighted variables as it is reasonable to expect a larger population would
be positively correlated to implementation of the SP order. That is because the reason
to implement the SP order is to reduce human interaction and in turn to reduce the
spread of the COVID-19. A larger population implies more human interactions because
human beings live together (nat, 2018). As the purpose of SP order is to “Flatten-
the-curve” and reduce the spread of COVID-19, ↵ is expected to be no less than zero.
Furthermore, the population of a county in week 12, 13,14, and 15 of 2020 should not
a↵ect the percent of good AQI. Consequently, the monotonicity assumption and exclusion
restriction, proposed by Angrist et al. (1996), are likely to hold for the IVs in this study.
To account for the short term (localized) e↵ect of SP order on air quality, the event-






c ⇥COVIDct) +Xct + ✓c + !st + ⇠ct (8)
where n denotes the 8-week period preceding, during, and following the SP order. The
8-week period is chosen because most states and counties have the SP order in place for
slightly less than 8 weeks, according to the data. The indicator variables, Scn, takes the
value of 1 if the county received the SP order in week n, and 0 otherwise. ↵ and  
are the parameters to be estimated. The terms Demc ⇥ COVIDct, Xct, ✓c, !sw, and
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 y are defined the same way as in the second-stage in main equation 6, and ⇠ct is the
idiosyncratic error term. The first period with the SP order is set to 0, implying that the
first period of SP order is omitted and all the estimated coe cients can be interpreted
as the approximate change relative to the first week with the SP order.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Main results
Table 4.2 presents a series of models regressing weekly level air quality in the period
2010-2020 on the SP order following equations 6 and 7. The county fixed e↵ect and the
state by period fixed e↵ect are controlled for in all models. To avoid unobserved season-
ality in estimation, data prior to 2020 beginning in 2010 are included in the model, with
estimation results shown in table 4.2. These additional data points became the controls
in the models and thus able to control for seasonality such that there are references from
the previous years. After incorporating air quality data prior to 2020, the OLS coe cient
estimates (columns 1 to 3) for SP order are statistically significant and are larger (ap-
proximately by 50%) than the corresponding regressions in columns 1 to 3 of table C1.
As a result, failing to account for seasonally biases the estimation downward. Because the
outcome of 2020 presidential election outcome proxy the political party a liation, it is
only representative for 2020. As a result, the PerCapitaCase and PerCapitaDeath are
included in all the specifications using full set of the data in table 3.2. More robust results
are observed, with all coe cient estimates for the primary variable of interest SPct being
significant at the 1 percent level. In the OLS models, a closer bound for the coe cient
estimates is also observed (range from 0.020 to 0.033) compared to the counterpart OLS
regression in table C1. When the SP order is in place, the estimation from model 3 in
table 4.2 suggests a 0.038 unit increase in %GoodAQI.
Then, this paper addresses the possible endogeneity in the implementation of the
SP order with the interacted terms of population and week 12 to 15 of 2020 as IVs to
instrument SPct. Before delving into the IV estimation, it is necessary to validate the
IV and the 2-stage least square (2SLS) approach by using the Weak instruments, Wu-
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Hausman, and Sargan tests. Because 2SLS produces a larger standard error (Wooldridge,
2010), it is not desirable unless necessary. With the f statistics for the weak instruments
test being well above 10 with a low p-value(cols. 4a, 5a, and 6a), which is a rule of
thumb for determining whether the IVs explain su cient variations in the endogenous
variable (Staiger and Stock, 1997), the test statistics clearly reject the null hypothesis
that the IV is irrelevant. The Wu-Hausman test is then carried out to check if 2SLS
outperforms the counterpart Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS). As shown in the
table, the p-value appears to be very low; implying that the null hypothesis that the SP
order is exogenous is not rejected. When exogeneity cannot be ruled out, that implies
endogeneity presents. Finally, good IVs rely on the fact that they are not endogenous
to the regression error terms. The Sargen test regresses the IVs on the residuals of the
second stage, and then the Chi square test is used to determine whether the IVs are
correlated with the residuals. As shown in table 4.2, despite the p-value for the Sargen
tests for model 4 and 5 are reject the null hypothesis of IVs validity, model 6 presents
the statistically insignificant test statistics at the 10 percent level, implying that the IVs
should not be rejected.
After instrumenting the SPct, the fitted estimate (models 4, 5, and 6 in table 4.2) is
much larger, implying that failing to account for endogeneity in SPct leads to a biased
downward estimation. Model 6 in the table 3.2 presents the 2SLS estimation including
other COVID-19 policies. The coe cient estimate appears to be larger than that in
model 4 and 5, suggesting that the exclusion of other COVID-19 policies confounds
the estimation. In addition, the four IVs passed Sargan test after controlling for other
COVID-19 policies. Since the all of the SP order for di↵erent states and counties were
implemented between week 12 to 15 of 2020, the IVs are expected to have a positive e↵ect
in explaining SPct.
In case the 2020 estimations are also of interest, they are presented in table C1.Table
C1 uses a subset of the data to reflect the e↵ect with using only 2020 data. Column
1 of table C1 displays the the result with the variable of interest ,the SP order, while
controlling for only the county and state by period fixed e↵ects. The estimation appears
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to be significantly di↵erent from 0 and have a positive e↵ect on %GoodAQI. Column 2 of
table 4.2 displays the result when per capita case and death are controlled for, as well as
their interaction with the county-specified political party a liation. When controlling for
other COVID-19 related variables, the coe cient estimate of the key variable has a very
close estimate as in column 1. Column 3 depicts the specification from column 2 as well as
a vector of COVID-19 policies.This is done to elucidate the potential confounding e↵ect
of other COVID-19 policies. While the result in table4.2for model 3 is not statistically
significant, the coe cient estimate possesses the consistent expected sign as in the other
models in rest of the table. Meanwhile, the 2SLS estimations are qualitatively similar
with a subset of the data that consists only 2020 data.
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Table 4.2: SP order on percent of Good AQI
Dependent variable:
%GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Shelter in Place (SPct) 0.033
⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.448⇤⇤⇤ 0.441⇤⇤⇤ 1.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.077) (0.084) (0.287)
Per Capita Case  0.096 4.586 18.263⇤⇤⇤  7.657⇤⇤⇤ 4.144⇤⇤  3.716
(1.540) (1.573) (2.427) (2.404) (2.018) (2.803)
Per Capita Death 194.538⇤⇤⇤ 174.949⇤⇤⇤ 131.863⇤⇤⇤ 115.822⇤⇤⇤ 3.377 151.229⇤⇤⇤
(22.927) (22.941) (33.950) (29.310) (18.369) (28.511)
Pop ⇥ Week122020 8.380e-08⇤⇤⇤ 8.028e-08⇤⇤⇤ 4.796e-08⇤⇤
(2.889e-08) (2.806e-08) (2.236e-08)
Pop ⇥ Week132020 9.301e-08⇤⇤⇤ 8.736e-08⇤⇤⇤ 4.619e-08⇤⇤
(3.202e-08) (3.062e-08) (1.929e-08)
Pop ⇥ Week142020 6.009e-08⇤⇤⇤ 5.332e-08⇤⇤⇤ 1.117e-08⇤
(1.961e-08) (1.801e-08) (5.916e-09)
Pop ⇥ Week152020 7.342e-08⇤⇤⇤ 6.728e-08⇤⇤⇤ 1.266e-08⇤
(2.287e-08) (2.142e-08) (6.764e-09)
Covid-19 Policies No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State by Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak inst.(f-stat) 956.9422 821.8957 17.9
Weak inst.(p-value) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ 1.077e   14⇤⇤⇤
Wu-Hausman(p-value) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤
Sargen(p-val.) 0.0007⇤⇤⇤ 0.0004⇤⇤⇤ 0.820
Observations 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839
R2 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.881 0.693 0.882 0.694 0.945 0.684
Note: The outcome variable is percent of Good AQI for columns 1 to 3, 4b, 5b, and 6b, while the outcome variable is the SP order in a county in a week for
columns 3a, 4a, and 5a. The explanatory variable is per capita COVID-19 case and death in models 2, 3, 5,and 6 and an extensive set of other COVID-19 policies
are include in models 3 and 6. All specifications include county, state by period fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county level and
robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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4.5.2 Event-study
Figure 4.3 plots the coe cient estimates from the full model outlined by equation 8,
which included the full set of COVID-19 policies and all the explaining variables, to
exploit variations in the percent of good AQI over time and identify the dynamic e↵ect
of the SP order. The bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Subfigure (a) depicts
the OLS model with the full set of data, while subfigure (b) depicts the counterpart 2SLS
model. The event-study plot with only 2020 data is presented in Appendix 4.7 figure
C2. The OLS event studies show a much larger magnitude of variation in the coe cient
estimates. The coe cient estimates of the 2LSL are much larger than the counterpart
OLS estimations (as shown in the vertical axes in 4.3), which is consistent with the results
shown in the table 3.2. 2SLS estimations are also more stable. All coe cient estimates
for subfigure () in figure 4.3 are insignificant (i.e. crossing the zero line) or lower (i.e.
below the zero line) during the pre-intervention period, denoted by the minus sign in the
horizontal axis. Because all of the coe cient estimates are relative to the first week’s
estimate, the 2SLS results appear to have increased the percent of good AQI that are
statistically significant. Meanwhile, the percentage of good AQI is lower in the post-
intervention period (denoted by the plus sign on the horizontal axis), as evidenced by the
estimates falling below the zero line. The phenomenon could be explained by the fact
that after being “Shelter-in-Place” for an extended period of time, people eventually get
out can conduct activities that may pollute the air, resulting in lower percentage of good
AQI.
4.6 Robustness checks
To assess the robustness of the main results, analysis with another dependent variable
(table 4.3) are performed in the preferred specifications (Models 3 and 6 in table 4.2).
Furthermore, analysis with data aggregated to the monthly level is also performed and
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(b) Shelter-in-Place, 2010-2020 — 2SLS
Figure 4.3: Event-study of Shelter-in-Place order, 2010-2020
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4.6.1 Alternative outcome variable
Table 4.3: Alternative Outcome Variable
Dependent variable:
AQI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shelter in Place (SPct)  0.380  58.138⇤⇤⇤  0.206  51.348⇤⇤
(0.468) (17.885) (0.605) (24.372)
Per Capita Case  33.780 208.850 449.880⇤⇤⇤ 574.664⇤⇤⇤
(120.291) (183.010) (140.874) (180.642)
Per Capita Death  8,702.669⇤⇤⇤  7,321.090⇤⇤⇤  5,811.213⇤⇤⇤  5,698.768⇤⇤⇤
(1,726.549) (2,001.577) (1,780.056) (1,938.684)
Covid-19 Policies Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 553,816 553,816 21,400 21,400
R2 0.688 0.681 0.750 0.661
Note: The outcome variable is AQI for all models. All specifications include explanatory variables
per capita COVID-19 case and death and a full set of COVID-19 policies, and county and period by
state fixed e↵ects. Models 1 and 2 uses full set of data, whereas model 3 and 4 uses a subset of 2020
data. Models in odd number are the OLS models while models in even numbers are the 2SLS models.
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
The following analysis is performed on the average AQI in a week for each county,
rather than the percent of good AQI in tables 4.2 and C1. The analysis performs on
the full data set is display in models 1 and 2, whereas the analysis performs on a subset
of 2020 data is displays in models 3 and 4. All of the models have negative coe cient
estimates, as shown in the results in table 4.3. Because better air quality is indicated
by lower AQI, this provides additional evidence that the SP order improves air quality.
Despite the key variable is not statistically significant in models 1 and 3 , the signs in
the estimations are consistent with what observed in tables 4.2 and C1, such that the
coe cient estimate of 2SLS is of larger magnitude than the counterpart OLS regression
and the magnitude of the estimates are larger after accounting for unobserved seasonality.
Using the model 2 estimation, the SP order reduces the AQI by 58.138 unit. With the
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mean AQI in the full dataset is 39, the SP order on average improves a county’s air to
the highest level.
4.6.2 Monthly data
This section presents the analysis in the preferred specification as in table 4.2 (model 3
and 5), with data aggregated to the monthly level as shown in table 4.4. Such robustness
check is done by following Dang and Trinh (2021) approach when assessing the impact
of shutdowns on air quality. The key variable in column 1 is statistically significant
and presents a very close estimate as in the preferred specification in table 4.2, even
when the data is aggregated to the monthly level. Regardless of whether a SP order was
implemented on the first day or last day in a month, the SPct dummy received a 1. The
2SLS predicts the SP order based on the interaction of population and month 3 and 4
of 2020, which accounts for the endogenous confounding factors in the SPct variable, is
statistically significant. Yet, the IVs do not pass the the weak instruments validity test
nor the monotonicity assumption. When the dummy variable of the interaction term
is aggregated to monthly level, it might confound the results as none of the county or
state had the SP order implemented for more than half of month 3. As a result, the
second-stage estimate is not valid without plausible IVs.
4.7 Conclusion
Using the causal influence approach, this study exploits the COVID-19 related positive
externality, specifically improved air quality. This notion is salient because most existing
literature focuses solely on the negative consequences of COVID-19, with little attention
paid to the unintended positive consequences. To analyze such an e↵ect, a large database
is complied from various sources and analyzed using the di↵erence-in-di↵erences and
event study approaches. Existing literature evaluates the SP order without accounting
for unobserved seasonality nor endogeniety of the SP order. From the OLS estimation,
the e↵ect is estimated to be between 0.020 to 0.033 percent more good air day when
account for seasonality, which is approximately 50 percent larger compared to the model
without controlling for unobserved seasonality. When both seasonality and endogeneity
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Shelter in Place (SPct) 0.019⇤⇤⇤  3.461⇤⇤
(0.005) (1.658)
perCapitaCase  0.278 0.186⇤⇤ 0.355
(0.203) (0.093) (0.490)






COVID-19 Policies Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Month by Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Weak instruments(f-stats) 2.63
Weak instruments(p-val) 0.0715⇤
Wu-Hausman(p-val) < 2.2e  16⇤⇤⇤
Sargen(p-val) 0.0245⇤⇤
Observations 126,909 126,909 126,909
R2 0.520 0.809 0.341
Note: The outcome variable is percent of good AQI for column 1 and 3. All specifications include
explanatory variables per capita COVID-19 case, a full set of COVID-19 policies, and county and month
by year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county level and robust to both
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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are addressed, the positive e↵ect is estimated to be 1.012 percent more good air day. Air
quality falls into the “Good” category, which implies that it causes little to no harm to
human health. The findings may have repercussions because the air a person breathes
can a↵ect health and long-term exposure to air pollution can raise the risk of other fatal




This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the broader impacts of pub-
lic policies and urbanization on natural resources and the environment in terms of energy
development, land-use change, and pollution. It investigates the causal relationships of
policy-induced human activities on the environment and provides important insights to
policymakers, informing better decision making.
This first essay investigates the impact of shale development on Kern County’s agricul-
tural industry. Because the energy and agricultural industries contributes significantly to
the region’s GDP, the study has significant implications for the local economy and long-
term sustainable development. This study focuses on the top five commodities grown in
Kern County and finds that shale oil extraction causes crop yield declines in three of the
five study crops, all of which are the high-value crops, while the other two crops that
appear to be una↵ected. Almonds, pistachios, and wine grape,in particular, experienced
yield declines during the study period, whereas potatoes and alfalfa did not. As the
world’s largest exporter of fruits and nuts, this could result into billion of dollars in lost
agricultural output. Despite the fact that several court cases have favored small farm
owners and resulted in oil companies paying settlements in million of dollars, it is not
surprising that the oil and gas industry is still thriving in the region, given that this is a
case of many small family-owned farms versus large oil companies.
Furthermore, even when shaling activities were reduced, the results show no sign of
crop yield returning to levels prior to the start of the shale boom. With California’s lax
regulatory environment surrounding shale oil extraction and the uncertainty about the
long-term impact on agricultural productivity, this study provides early evidence of the
potential long-run impact of shale development on agriculture. This study, on the other
hand, looks at the region’s five major crops. This is especially useful for policy makers
and agricultural producers when deciding where to locate drilling activities in order to
migrate the negative externality on agricultural production.
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The second essay assesses the e cacy of a contentious policy in Utah. This is a policy
that has been in place for over 50 years with the goal to conserving peri-urban farmland.
With Utah having the fastest growing population in the country, this study is crucial
for the regional development and planning. In Utah, the Farmland Assessment Act is
a preferential tax program that o↵ers lower tax rate to agricultural land owners based
on the land qualification and the owners’ voluntary application for the preferential tax
treatment. Because agricultural land generates less revenue in general, agricultural land
near urban centers is under a lot of development pressure. However, peri-urban farmland
is the most productive because humans tend to settle in fertile areas where crops can be
grown. As a result, it is critical to conserve peri-urban farmland by providing preferential
tax treatment to farmland, as taxing land at the current market value would be unprof-
itable for agricultural operations. The study employs 2-stage least square to account for
endogeneity in a voluntary program, parcel-level data to account for a lack of plausible
counterfactuals, and satellite data to account for a lack of micro-level explanatory data.
Because Utah’s Farmland Assessment Act allows for secondary agricultural use, it
creates an incentive for landowners to develop their land without foregoing the preferential
tax treatment. The overall e↵ect for all farmland in Salt Lake County over the study
period is that land that receives preferential tax treatment is found to be 1.3% more
capable of conserving farmland than land that does not receive such treatment. The
research design decomposes the treatment unit in order to identify units that can develop
without losing their preferential tax treatment and units that cannot develop without
losing their status. According to the estimated results, land that cannot be developed
without losing its preferential status was able to preserve farmland, resulted in 1.3% lower
in farmland conversion; whereas land that can develop without losing its preferential
status encourages urban development, resulted in 24% higher in farmland conversion.
The findings support the hypothesis of policy abuse while raise questions about whether
the policy is e↵ective in preserving peri-urban farmland for Utah. Last but not least,
the five-year rollback tax undermines the policy e↵ect on farmland close to urban core
boundary because those farmland would simply not enrolled in the program as they are
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expected to develop soon.
The findings of this study have important implications for Utah’s ongoing Urban
Farmland Assessment Act, which is a preservation program targeted at conserving smaller
farmland. This act was recently amended to reduce the land size requirement from two
contiguous acres to one, and is recommended to the state government that the policy be
extended to another fastest growing county in Utah. As the preferential tax treatment
essentially shifts the tax burden from agricultural to urban landowners, policymakers
must weigh the tradeo↵ between land preservation and abuse of the tax break provision.
The final essay examines the causal relationships between reduced human activity on
improved air quality. When the novel COVID-19 pandemic hit the world, many govern-
ments imposed stay at home restrictions. Shelter-in-Place orders were widely adopted at
the state and county levels in the country at varying times. This provides an opportunity
to evaluate the Shelter-in-Place order using a causal influence analysis approach. This
study complied a comprehensive database of COVID-19 policies at the state and county
levels, as well as the air quality index from 2010 to 2020. After controlling for endogene-
ity in the Shelter-in-Place order, seasonality in air pollution, political party influence on
implementation of COVID-19 policies, and any e↵ect from other COVID-19 policies, the
estimated results suggest that having a Shelter-in-Place order increased the chance of air
quality that falls into the “Good” category by 1.012%. While the estimate is low, this
category of air quality is the most stringent, posing little to no threat to human health.
This equates to 3.69 days of highest quality of air (as classified by the US EPA’s AQI)
each year .
This study is interesting in and of itself because it exploits the unintended positive
externality of the Shelter-in-Place order. In addition to existing literature, it addresses the
potential endogeneity issues associated with policy implementation and the seasonality
problem that is common to air pollution. The outcome variable used in the study also set
it apart from other studies, such that it provides an estimate that can be interpreted as
the highest quality of air, rather than an estimate value of air pollutants. The advantage
of estimating in term of highest quality of air is that it can be interpreted as is without
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referring to studies that provides dollar estimates of certain level of air pollutants because
a value of any air pollutant does not have much meaning of it own. Furthermore, because
it measures the percentage of “Good” air quality, any e↵ect is not average out, even when
estimating on a weekly or monthly basis.
All three essays in this dissertation contribute to a better understanding of urbanization-
induced public policies and their e↵ects on natural resources and regional development.
This dissertation used extensive data processing, machine learning techniques, and the
utilization of high-resolution long-temporal satellite data to achieve policy-oriented anal-
ysis. The three studies in this dissertation revealed that various policy have unintended
consequences. In some cases, policies result in negative externalities, but in others, poli-
cies can result in positive externalities. A balance between alternative actions should
be considered when designing public policies because it is very likely that some parties
benefit at the expense of others.
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Notes
1Rogers (2011) provide an excellent review of the genesis of the U.S. shale industry.
2For a detailed review of economic and budgetary e↵ects of producing oil and natural gas from shale,
see Congressional Budget O ce (2014).
3For an in-depth discussion of various negative externalities of the industry, see Long et al. (2016)
and Vengosh et al. (2017).
4See Jackson et al. (2014) for the environmental cost-benefit analysis of fracking.
5The bulk of the existing literature focuses on the e↵ects of fracking on farmer’s wealth in the form of
lease and royalty payments from the oil and gas industry (Weber et al., 2013; Thakor, 2019); competition
between the two industries for water and land (Gaudet et al., 2006; Hitaj et al., 2014); and agricultural
land rent in the presence of oil and gas wells (Rakitan, 2018); among others.
6In fact, as shown in Appendix Figure A1, Kern’s fracking infrastructure essentially sits on what
amounts to be a single groundwater basin. This means groundwater contamination due to fracking ac-
tivities is not necessarily confined to a site where the actual spill or leakage of fracking fluid or wastewater
occurs. The pollutants can move in groundwater, potentially a↵ecting the water quality and agriculture
in areas far from the original pollution site. The larger the amount of spill/leakage, the farther is the
reach of its adverse e↵ects.
7Class II wells are used to inject fluids associated with oil and natural gas production, and can be
used not only as enhanced recovery wells or hydrocarbon storage wells, but also as waste disposal wells.
Class II waste disposal wells make up roughly 20% of the total number of Class II wells in the US (US
Environmental Protection Agency, 2019). Integrity of Class II storage wells is crucial in preventing
underground leaks and seepage of wastewater.
8Between 2011 and mid-2014, unlined percolation pits in California received wastewater produced in
only Kern County (Long et al., 2016).
9In Section 2.8, we discuss in greater detail the (nascent) regulatory environment surrounding uncon-
ventional oil and gas activities in California.
10An increase in the coverage of hydraulic fracturing and agriculture was also observed in other states
around the same time. For instance, the combined number of articles published by the New York-based
newspapers on hydraulic fracturing and farming was 1 article in 2007, 11 in 2008, 32 in 2009, 109 in
2010, 265 in 2011, 250 in 2012, 105 in 2013, 207 in 2014, and 40 in 2015 (Sneegas, 2016).
11In that sense, our identification strategy is reminiscent of that employed by Cano-Urbina et al.
(2019), who identify the e↵ects of o↵shore drilling on nearby housing markets by exploiting BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, a specific occurrence of o↵shore drilling’s negative externality. Similar strategy was also
adopted by Morgan et al. (2016).
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12Evaluating agricultural productivity at county level is common in the existing literature. See, for
instance, Schlenker and Roberts (2009) and Lobell et al. (2014). Although performing the analysis
at farm or parcel level is desirable, such e↵orts are limited by the fact that historical data on the
location of fracking wells and percolation pits in California is not publicly available due to confidentiality
reasons. The only fracking data that is made publicly available by DOGGR of California Department of
Conservation is the aggregate data reported in Figure 2.2, which is not useful for granular analysis.
13Additional information on study variables and counties can be found in Appendix 4.7.
14Planting and harvesting calendar for each crop is obtained from County of Kern, Agriculture and
Measurement Standards, which is available at http://www.kernag.com/dept/stats/crop-stats.asp.
15According to U.S. Geological Survey (2016), “evapotranspiration is defined as the water lost to the
atmosphere from the ground surface, evaporation from the capillary fringe of the groundwater table,
and the transpiration of groundwater by plants whose roots tap the capillary fringe of the groundwater
table.”
16The DID analysis with post-2009 as the treatment period produces qualitatively similar results.
Besides, Figures 2.6 and 2.7 already report the DID point estimates for each year in our study period.
17All dollar estimates are derived using the unit value and total production of the specific crops in
2015 with information obtained from (Department of Agriculture and Measurement Standards, 2015).
18In 2005, the United States Congress exempted hydraulic fracturing from the SDWA (Tiemann and
Vann, 2013).
19This is because people inhabit in the most productive areas and urban development first occurs
there.
20Yet the exclusive farm use zoning combined with the urban growth boundary planning has proved
moderately successful in Oregon (Nelson, 1992; Howe, 1993; Alterman, 1997; Jacobs, 1999).
21“Those states that impose no penalty at all when a parcel is removed from current-use property
classification” see England (2002)
22“Those states that collect several years of tax savings, plus interest, for the period immediately prior
to development” see England (2002)
23“Those states that collect a penalty based upon the market value of the property at the time of its
development” see England (2002)
24“The production requirement may be waived if the owner can show that the property has been in
agricultural production for the previous two years and that failure to meet the production requirement
in a particular year was due to no fault or act of the owner, purchaser, or lessee. The land production
requirement may be waived in the short run if the land is in a bona-fide range improvement program,
crop rotation program or other similarly accepted agricultural practice which does not give a reasonable
opportunity to satisfy the production requirement.” see Israelsen et al. (2009)
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25“The roll-back tax is the di↵erence between the taxes paid while in greenbelt and the taxes which
would have been paid had the property been assessed at market value. In determining the amount of
roll-back tax due, the tax rate and market value for each of the years in question will be applied to
determine the tax amount.” see Utah State Tax Commission (2020b).
26Nationally Significant Agricultural land is land that is best-suited for long-term viability of agricul-
tural and intensive crop production (American Farmland Trust, 2020).
27Number of farms, land in farms (acres), and average size of farm (acres) are all decreasing since 2012
with the percentage change of 6%, 21%, and 16% respectively (Census of Agricultural, 2017).
28The GB eligibility IV was created based on land use information of both the current year and the
preceding two years. Thus, data for the first two years (2008 and 2009) can be only used to construct the
IV variables for year 2010. In a related matter, since we use the RHS variables in year t (e.g., 2017) to
explain the LHS variable between year t and t+1 (e.g., 2017 and 2018), there are eight periods involved
in our panel data regression.
29We include cropland that has the following CDL code: 1, 4, 5, 12, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 33, 35, 36, 37,
42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 57, 59, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 77, 205, 216, 222, 229, 237, 250, and 61. Please
note that this is not the entire list of crops that CDL measures, but these are the types of cropland in
Salt Lake County from 2008 to 2018. Interested parties can refer to CDL metadata for more information.
30We include grassland that has the following CDL code: 152 and 176.
31We include developed pixel that has the following CDL code: 121,122,123,124.
32Discussion of this mythology in details would be out of the scope for this paper. Interested party
can refer to Approximate String Matching (Fuzzy Matching) algorithm developed by Jarkko Kietaniemi.
33Medium and high density developed land are defined with the CDL code 143 and 144 respectively.
34We can only give the lower estimate because we have no prior information on whether the parcels
were GB parcels before 2008 nor we can predict the parcels will stay as GB parcels in the future.
35There are some fundamental criteria that need to be met in a RDD. First, there are multiple
assignment variables to meet the GB criteria: 1) total agricultural acreage in a GB parcel under the same
ownership, 2) the EVI-based productivity, and 3) actively devoted to agricultural use in the previous
two years. It is challenging to either use the three assignment variables separately or combine the three
into a single variable(e.g., how to assign a weight to each variable and how to choose the cut-point
for the new assignment variable) in a conventional RDD. Second, The fundamental assumption for a
valid RDD is that individuals cannot precisely manipulate the assignment variable. In other words, “[i]f
individuals have a great deal of control over the assignment variable and if there is a perceived benefit
to a treatment, one would certainly expect individuals on one side of the threshold to be systematically
di↵erent from those on the other side.” (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In our study, a landowner can precisely
practice agricultural activities in the past two years. Despite the presence of uncertainty, a landowner
91
can improve land productivity by increasing agricultural inputs (labor, fertilizer, irrigation, machine,
pesticides, etc.) and the qualification threshold of 50% of the county average should be easily passed.
Thus, this fundamental assumption is likely to be violated in the context of this study especially when
the three assignment variables are used separately in a RDD. The third challenge is also related to
the criterion of active agricultural use in the past two years, which is a dummy variable instead of
a continuous variable commonly required in a RDD. This dummy variable would not pass the visual
inspection for no discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable around the cut-point (McCrary,
2008).
36Note that all non-GB parcels are assigned zeros when we define the two binary variables.
37The bias of the IV estimate is primarily determined by the ratio of the instrument-omitted variable
correlation to the instrument-endogenous variable correlation.
38This is the income generated by agricultural output.
39In addition to the discrepancy in the definition or naming across counties and states, there appears
to be a discrepancy in the definition SP order and other COVID-19 policies among several data sources.
Appendix 4.7 contains additional information on the COVID-19 policies.
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Figure A1: Location of hydraulic fracturing and agriculture in relation to under-
ground water basin in Kern County. Data on fracking and waste disposal wells
(as of 2018) are obtained from the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources
(DOGGR) of California Department of Conservation. Data on percolation pits (as
of 2018) are obtained from California Water Boards. The cropland layer is obtained
from the Kern County Agriculture Department. The groundwater basin layer is ob-
tained from California Department of Water Resources.
111
Table A1: Control counties by crop type.
Almond Pistachios Alfalfa (Hay) Grapes (Wine) Potatoes
1 Butte Butte Alameda Alameda Imperial
2 Colusa* Glenn* Amador Amador Modoc
3 Glenn* Madera* Butte Calaveras Riverside
4 Madera* Merced Colusa* Colusa* San Diego
5 Merced San Bernardino Contra Costa Contra Costa San Joaquin
6 San Joaquia Tehama Glenn* El Dorado Siskiyou
7 Solano* Imperial Lake
8 Stanislaus Inyo Madera*
9 Tehama Lassen Marin
10 Yolo Madera* Mariposa






17 San Bernardino Riverside
18 San Benito* Sacramento
19 San Joaquin San Bernardino
20 San Luis Obispo* San Benito*
21 Santa Clara* Sam Diego
22 Shasta San Joaquin
23 Sierra San Luis Obispo*
24 Siskiyou Santa Clara*







Note: Counties denoted by * are California counties with very little fracking activity. Specifi-
cally, these are counties with less than or equal to three active fracking wells and/or percolation
pits and less than or equal to 10 total (active + inactive + historical) fracking wells and/or
percolation pits.
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Table A2: Treatment and control units’ characteristics.
Almond Grapes (Wine) Pistachios Potatoes Alfalfa (Hay)
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Pre-2010
Crop yield (ton/acre) 1.11 0.819 10.0 3.81 1.56 0.912 20.6 16.8 8.21 6.15
Precipitation (inch, crop-specific) 0.811 1.99 0.489 1.54 1.01 2.42 0.878 1.32 0.343 0.871
Mean temperature (F, crop-specific) 63.4 61.4 66.5 62.8 59.4 58.3 55.5 53.7 69.8 63.8
Mean PDSI -1.14 -0.962 -1.14 -1.04 -1.14 -1.03 -1.14 -1.23 -1.14 -1.03
Evapotranspiration (inch, crop-specific) 4.13 3.83 5.28 4.64 3.24 3.11 20.6 4.48 8.21 5.72
Pesticide (lb/acre, crop-specific) 50.1 15.9 38.5 28.8 32.1 8.68 61.2 33.6 0.83 1.39
% of farm employment 4.64 6.05 4.64 2.94 4.64 6.19 4.64 5.29 4.64 4.03
Annual growth, farm employment -4.95 -3.76 -4.95 -3.70 -4.95 -4.40 -4.95 -4.56 -4.95 -3.67
% of total Income from farms 4.53 4.10 4.53 1.31 4.53 4.17 4.53 4.40 4.53 2.62
Post-2010
Crop yield (ton/acre) 1.14 0.880 10.4 4.02 1.36 1.10 26.7 17.5 7.95 6.04
Precipitation (inch, crop-specific) 0.516 1.31 0.573 1.86 0.629 1.63 1.19 1.22 0.402 1.01
Mean temperature (F, crop-specific) 64.9 62.8 68.0 62.7 61.0 60.1 57.1 55.7 70.3 64.4
Mean PDSI -2.39 -1.73 -2.39 -1.67 -2.39 -1.77 -2.39 -1.60 -2.39 -1.59
Evapotranspiration (inch, crop-specific) 4.35 3.95 5.51 4.79 3.47 3.22 4.97 4.78 6.51 5.96
Pesticide (lb/acre, crop-specific) 46.2 14.1 42.9 28.0 23.5 12.4 82.3 17.7 1.40 1.63
% of farm employment 4.57 6.25 4.57 2.85 4.57 6.75 4.57 4.60 4.57 4.27
Annual growth, farm employment 2.13 1.31 2.13 -0.0885 2.13 1.22 2.13 1.96 2.13 1.07
% of total Income from farms 5.26 5.94 5.26 1.76 5.26 6.68 5.26 4.17 5.26 3.50
Note: Reported are the means of study variables for the corresponding group (treatment/control) for the pre- and post-2010.
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Event study analysis using expanded control pool and linear temperature e↵ect. The
dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used are pre-
cipitation, temperature, PDSI, pesticide, and economic variables. All specifications
include county and year fixed e↵ects. Each dot represents the main DID estimate
from equation (1) in the corresponding year. The whiskers represent the 95% confi-
dence interval.
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Event study analysis using expanded control pool and nonlinear temperature e↵ect.
The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used are
precipitation, mean temperature, mean temperature squared, PDSI, pesticide, and
economic variables. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Each dot
represents the main DID estimate from equation (1) in the corresponding year. The
whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Table A3: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis using expanded control pool and linear
temperature e↵ect.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Almond
Treatit  0.109⇤⇤⇤  0.110⇤⇤⇤  0.124⇤⇤⇤  0.124⇤⇤⇤  0.108⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 156 144 144 144 144
R2 0.026 0.042 0.033 0.055 0.065
Grapes (Wine)
Treatit  0.830⇤⇤⇤  0.486  0.448⇤⇤⇤  0.477⇤  0.626⇤⇤⇤
(0.226) (0.440) (0.148) (0.251) (0.222)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 358 329 308 329 308
R2 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.010 0.075
Pistachios
Treatit  0.517⇤⇤⇤  0.418⇤⇤⇤  0.447⇤⇤⇤  0.621⇤⇤⇤  0.143⇤
(0.042) (0.080) (0.096) (0.060) (0.078)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 89 83 73 83 73
R2 0.068 0.143 0.091 0.098 0.209
Potatoes
Treatit 2.552 3.342⇤⇤ 2.185 2.421⇤ 2.850⇤⇤
(1.896) (1.540) (1.671) (1.383) (1.353)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 88 82 81 82 81
R2 0.017 0.175 0.018 0.158 0.261
Alfalfa (Hay)
Treatit 0.038 0.294⇤⇤⇤ 0.230⇤⇤ 0.160 0.280⇤⇤⇤
(0.103) (0.106) (0.117) (0.109) (0.106)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes
Observations 360 335 326 335 326
R2 0.00003 0.037 0.002 0.041 0.080
Note: The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used are
precipitation, temperature, PDSI, pesticide, and economic variables. All specifications include
county and year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county level and
robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table A4: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis using expanded control pool and non-
linear temperature e↵ect.
Almond Grapes (Wine) Pistachios Alfalfa Potatoes
Treatit  0.124⇤⇤⇤  0.676⇤⇤⇤  0.043 0.272⇤⇤ 2.850⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.223) (0.109) (0.113) (1.369)
Temperature and climate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pesticide Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 144 320 73 328 81
R2 0.068 0.077 0.238 0.080 0.261
Note: The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used are
precipitation, mean temperature, mean temperature squared, PDSI, pesticide, and economic
variables. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthe-
sis are clustered at county level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Figure A4: Event study analysis with an alternative control for temperature and






























































Event study analysis using clean control pool. The dependent variable is crop yield
(ton/acre). The explanatory variables used are evapotranspiration, pesticide, and
economic variables. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Each
dot represents the main DID estimate from equation (1) in the corresponding year.
The whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure A5: Event study analysis with an alternative control for temperature and






























































Event study analysis using expanded control pool. The dependent variable is crop
yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used are evapotranspiration, pesticide,
and economic variables. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Each
dot represents the main DID estimate from equation (1) in the corresponding year.
The whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Table A5: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis using clean control pool.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Almond
Treatit  0.107⇤⇤⇤  0.126⇤⇤⇤  0.124⇤⇤⇤  0.113⇤⇤⇤  0.116⇤⇤⇤




Observations 104 96 96 96 96
R2 0.039 0.052 0.081 0.101 0.125
Grapes (Wine)
Treatit  0.689⇤⇤⇤  0.266  0.330⇤⇤  0.337  0.542⇤⇤⇤




Observations 311 223 266 287 211
R2 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.022 0.047
Pistachios
Treatit  0.539⇤⇤⇤  0.611⇤⇤⇤  0.466⇤⇤⇤  0.611⇤⇤⇤  0.468⇤⇤⇤




Observations 76 71 61 71 61
R2 0.100 0.122 0.142 0.200 0.219
Potatoes
Treatit 2.919 2.496 2.595 2.758 2.503




Observations 75 70 69 70 69
R2 0.022 0.073 0.019 0.159 0.169
Alfalfa (Hay)
Treatit  0.060 0.151 0.145 0.057 0.092




Observations 282 221 254 263 220
R2 0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.031 0.038
Note: The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used
are evapotranspiration, pesticide, and economic variables. All specifications include
county and year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county
level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05;
⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table A6: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis using expanded control pool.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Almond
Treatit  0.099⇤⇤⇤  0.126⇤⇤⇤  0.112⇤⇤⇤  0.109⇤⇤⇤  0.122⇤⇤⇤




Observations 143 120 132 132 120
R2 0.024 0.042 0.030 0.059 0.062
Grapes (Wine)
Treatit  0.673⇤⇤⇤  0.235  0.305⇤  0.297  0.475⇤⇤




Observations 343 252 295 316 240
R2 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.012 0.042
Pistachios
Treatit  0.517⇤⇤⇤  0.615⇤⇤⇤  0.447⇤⇤⇤  0.621⇤⇤⇤  0.361⇤⇤⇤




Observations 89 77 73 83 67
R2 0.068 0.111 0.091 0.098 0.222
Potatoes
Treatit 2.919 2.496 2.595 2.758 2.503




Observations 75 70 69 70 69
R2 0.022 0.073 0.019 0.159 0.169
Alfalfa (Hay)
Treatit  0.075 0.040 0.110 0.022  0.041




Observations 334 257 302 311 256
R2 0.0001 0.009 0.011 0.042 0.051
Note: The dependent variable is crop yield (ton/acre). The explanatory variables used
are evapotranspiration, pesticide, and economic variables. All specifications include
county and year fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county
level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05;
⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Event study analysis using clean control pool. The dependent variable is evapotran-
spiration. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Each dot represents
the main DID estimate from equation (1), where the dependent variable is replaced
with evapotranspiration, in the corresponding year. The whiskers represent the 95%
confidence interval.
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Event study analysis using expanded control pool. The dependent variable is evap-
otranspiration. All specifications include county and year fixed e↵ects. Each dot
represents the main DID estimate from equation (1), where the dependent variable
is replaced with evapotranspiration, in the corresponding year. The whiskers repre-


















































Figure B1: Percentage change in agricultural land and developed land of Salt Lake
County, 2010-2018. Source: USDA-NASS Cropland Data.
Table B1: Summary of property Tax on Greenbelt and Non-Greenbelt parcels in Salt
Lake County, Utah
USD ($) Non-GB Parcels (% of PV) GB Parcels (% of PV)
Property value (PV) 956,738 1,365,796
Amount taxable 337,311 (35.26) 56,492 (4.14)
Property Tax 3,575 - 5,869 (0.37 - 0.61) 599 - 983 (0.044 - 0.072)
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(b) Urban conversion by distance to urban core boundary
Figure B3: Spatial heterogeneity in urban conversion
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Table B2: Robustness checks with alternative dependent variables
Dependent variable:
AgtoD(1,0) log(AgtoD) AgtoD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GB  0.033⇤⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤  0.014⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
GBs  0.032⇤⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤  0.013⇤
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
GBl 0.468⇤⇤⇤ 0.197⇤⇤⇤ 0.261⇤⇤⇤
(0.057) (0.025) (0.034)
Distance (mile)  0.048⇤⇤⇤  0.049⇤⇤⇤  0.026⇤⇤⇤  0.027⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Productivity 0.104⇤⇤⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.065⇤⇤⇤ 0.063⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
UFAA  0.155⇤⇤⇤  0.142⇤⇤⇤  0.028⇤⇤⇤  0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.028⇤⇤⇤  0.021⇤⇤
(0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Parcel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940
R2 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001
Mean of dep. variable 0.383 0.383 0.229 0.229 0.326 0.326
Note: The dependent variable are the indication of urban conversion (1,0) for model 1 and 2; agricultural
land conversion rate with log-transformation for model 3 and 4; and the agricultural land conversion rate
without transformation for model 5 and 6. The dependent variables measure the conversion to all kinds
of developed land (open, low, medium, and high density). All models are the second stages where the
corresponding first stages are presented in tables 3.2 and 3.3. All models include parcel and ZIP code
by period fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at parcel-level and robust to both
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
Table B3: Robustness checks with nonlinear distance
Dependent variable:
GB % AgtoD GBs GBl % AgtoD
First stage Second stage First stage First stage Second stage







GB Eligibility 0.634⇤⇤⇤ 0.635⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
5 Ag acre 0.163⇤⇤⇤  0.166⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010)
Distance(mile)  0.003  0.055⇤⇤⇤  0.006⇤⇤ 0.003  0.056⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Productivity 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
UFAA  0.012  0.029⇤⇤⇤  0.010  0.001  0.022⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008)
Squared distance(mile) 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.00005 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Parcel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year x Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak inst(F-stat) 62607 - 52246 1519.1 -
Weak inst(p-val) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ -
Wu-Hausman(p-val) 0.02302⇤⇤ - 6.388e   07⇤⇤⇤ 2.119e   15⇤⇤⇤ -
Observations 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940
R2 0.340 0.005 0.462 0.037 0.001
Mean of dep. variable 0.095 0.289 0.064 0.031 0.289
Note: The dependent variable of the first stage is GB designation in column 1a, GB parcels that agricul-
ture acre is no less than 5 in cloumn 2a, and GB designated parcels that agriculture acre is more than 5
in column 2b. The dependent variable for the second stages are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformed
rate of urban conversion measured in acre. This measures the conversion to all kinds of developed land
(open, low, medium, and high density). All specifications include parcel and ZIP code by period fixed
e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at parcel-level and robust to both heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table B4: Robustness checks without UFAA and with EVI-based UFAA
Dependent variable:
GB % AgtoD GBs GBl % AgtoD GB % AgtoD GBs GBl % AgtoD
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (4c)






GB Eligibility 0.634⇤⇤⇤ 0.635⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤ 0.634⇤⇤⇤ 0.635⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
5 Ag acre 0.162⇤⇤⇤  0.166⇤⇤⇤ 0.162⇤⇤⇤  0.166⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Distance (mile) 0.007⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤  0.033⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Productivity 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.058⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
UFAA (EVI based) 0.0001  0.035⇤⇤⇤ 0.009  0.008  0.030⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008)
Parcel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak inst.(F-stat) 62590 - 52228 2279 - 62588 - 52229 2276.4 -
Weak inst.(p-val) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ - < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ -
Wu-Hausman(p-val) 0.01881⇤⇤ - 3.58e   07⇤⇤⇤ 6.071e   16⇤⇤⇤ - 0.01833⇤⇤ - 3.443e   07⇤⇤⇤ 8.581e   16⇤⇤⇤ -
Observations 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940 183,940
R2 0.340 0.005 0.462 0.037 0.001 0.340 0.005 0.462 0.037 0.001
Mean of dep. variable 0.095 0.289 0.064 0.031 0.289 0.095 0.289 0.064 0.031 0.289
Note: The dependent variable of the first stages are GB for column 1a and 3a, GBs for columns 2a and 4a, and GBl for columns 2b and 4b. The dependent
variable for the second stages are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformed rate of agricultural land conversion, which measures the conversion to all kinds of
developed land (open, low, medium, and high density). All specifications include parcel and ZIP code by period fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at parcel-level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table B5: Summary Statistics of the Outcome and Explanatory Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Urban conversion rate (%) 183,940 28.9 40.2 0 100
GreenBelt (GB) (%) 183,940 9.5 - - -
GB
s (%) 183,940 6.4 24.4 - -
GB
l (%) 183,940 3.1 17.3 - -
GB Eligibility (%) 183,940 25.9 43.8 0 100
Distance (mile) 183,940 0.283 0.638 0 7.522
Productivity (%) 183,940 26.8 37.2 0 100
Squared distance (mile) 183,940 0.487 2.376 0 56.579
5 Ag acre (%) 183,940 86.1 34.5 - -
PriAg (%) 183,940 69.7 45.9 - -
UFAA (%) 183,940 0.7 8.1 - -
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Figure C1: AQI and Seasonality
Note: The red strips represent June to August, while the blue strips represents December to February.
C1 plots the average percent good AQI from 2010 to 2020. It appears that at a
given year, percent of good AQI is lower in summer month, while it is higher in einter
month. In figure 4.3, the subfigure (a) is the OLS model with 2020 data; subfigure (b)
is the counterpart 2SLS model. Similar to the regressions presented in table 3.2, the
interacted terms of population and week 12 to 15 of 2020 are used to instrument shelter
in the first-stage for the results presented in subfigure b. The other half the estimates
are insignificant for subfigure (b) in figure 4.3.
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Table C1: SP order on percent of Good AQI in 2020
Dependent variable:
%GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Shelter in Place (SPct 0.024
⇤⇤⇤ 0.023⇤⇤⇤ 0.002 0.915⇤⇤⇤ 0.866⇤⇤⇤ 1.149⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.254) (0.251) (0.460)
Per Capita Case  7.812⇤⇤⇤  6.081⇤⇤⇤  3.734⇤⇤  4.962⇤  0.110  6.186⇤⇤
(1.867) (1.833) (1.853) (2.774) (1.709) (2.846)
Per Capita Death 98.787⇤⇤⇤ 72.756⇤⇤⇤ 31.826⇤⇤ 71.568⇤⇤ 11.094 60.070⇤
(26.972) (26.344) (16.220) (32.460) (13.906) (32.414)
Per Capita Case*Dem 5.882⇤⇤ 6.497⇤⇤ 9.546⇤⇤⇤  0.914 7.666⇤⇤⇤  1.382
(2.805) (2.767) (2.800) (4.358) (2.671) (5.326)
Per Capita Death*Dem 120.291⇤⇤⇤ 88.783⇤⇤  37.186 106.102⇤⇤  58.998⇤⇤ 128.907⇤⇤
(37.531) (36.033) (34.851) (45.242) (29.249) (50.887)
Pop ⇥ Week122020 4.401e-08⇤⇤ 4.427e-08⇤⇤ 3.717e-08⇤
(2.187e-08) (2.192e-08) (2.127e-08)
Pop ⇥ Week132020 5.076e-08⇤⇤⇤ 3.425e-11⇤⇤⇤ 3.064e-08⇤⇤
(1.935e-08) (1.948e-08) (1.439e-08)
Pop ⇥ Week142020 1.770e-08⇤⇤ 1.753e-08⇤⇤ 4.465e-09
(7.659e-09) (7.695e-09) (5.141e-09)
Pop ⇥ Week152020 8.008e-09 7.950e-09 1.409e-09
(5.887e-09) (6.000e-09) (5.341e-09)
Covid-19 Policies No No No No Yes No No No No
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State by Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak insts.(f-stat) 20.5 20.2 13.9
Weak insts.(p-val.) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ 1.217e   16⇤⇤⇤ 2.523e   11⇤⇤⇤
Wu-Hausman(p-val.) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤
Sargen(p-val.) 0.444 0.204 0.666
Observations 21,463 21,463 21,463 21,463 21,463 21,463 21,463 21,463 21,463
R2 0.785 0.786 0.796 0.942 0.504 0.942 0.534 0.960 0.470
Note: The outcome variable is percent of Good AQI for columns 1 to 3, 4b, 5b, and 6b, while the outcome variable is the SP order in a county in a week for
columns 3a, 4a, and 5a. The explanatory variable is per capita COVID-19 case and death in models 2, 3, 5,and 6 and an extensive set of other COVID-19
policies are include in models 3 and 6. All specifications include county, state by period fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county level
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(b) Shelter-in-Place, 2020 — 2SLS
Figure C2: Event study of Shelter-in-Place order, 2020
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Shelter in Place (SPct) 0.003  3.256
(0.025) (2.863)
Per Capita Case  3.448 0.093  3.256
(1.240) (0.979) (2.863)
Per Capita Death 60.451  0.594 58.619⇤⇤
(23.025) (7.017) (29.310)
Per Capita Case*Dem 3.491 2.187⇤ 9.554
(1.737) (1.145) (9.436)






COVID-19 Policies Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes
State by Period FE Yes Yes Yes
Weak instruments(f-stats) 0.695
Weak instruments(p-val) < 2.2e  16⇤⇤⇤
Wu-Hausman(p-val) < 2.2e  16⇤⇤⇤
Sargen(p-val) 0.0016⇤⇤⇤
Observations 5,473 5,473 5,473
R2 0.758 0.990 0.258
Note: The outcome variable is percent of good AQI for column 1 and 3. All specifications include
explanatory variables per capita COVID-19 case and death , the interaction of per capita COVID-19
case and per capita COVID-19 death with county-specific political party a liation, a full set of COVID-
19 policies, and county and state by Period fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
county level and robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table C3: Main results clustered at the state-level
Dependent variable:
%GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI SPct %GoodAQI
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
Shelter in Place (SPct) 0.033
⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.020⇤⇤⇤ 0.448⇤⇤⇤ 0.441⇤⇤⇤ 1.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.077) (0.084) (0.287)
Per Capita Case  0.096 4.586 18.263⇤⇤⇤  7.657⇤⇤⇤ 4.144⇤⇤  3.716
(1.540) (1.573) (2.427) (2.404) (2.018) (2.803)
Per Capita Death 194.538⇤⇤⇤ 174.949⇤⇤⇤ 131.863⇤⇤⇤ 115.822⇤⇤⇤ 3.377 151.229⇤⇤⇤
(22.931) (22.947) (33.950) (29.318) (18.369) (28.518)
Pop ⇥ Week122020 8.380e-08⇤⇤ 8.028e-08⇤⇤⇤ 4.796e-08
(3.550e-08) (3.494e-08) (3.631e-08)
Pop ⇥ Week132020 9.301e-08⇤⇤ 8.736e-08⇤⇤⇤ 4.619e-08
(3.967e-08) (3.829e-08) (3.136e-08)
Pop ⇥ Week142020 6.009e-08⇤⇤ 5.332e-08⇤⇤⇤ 1.117e-08
(1.998e-08) (1.848e-08) (9.423e-09)
Pop ⇥ Week152020 7.342e-08⇤⇤⇤ 6.728e-08⇤⇤⇤ 1.266e-08
(2.083e-08) (1.923e-08) (1.220e-08)
Covid-19 Policies No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State by Week FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak inst.(f-stat) 956.9422 821.8957 17.9
Weak inst.(p-value) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ 1.077e   14⇤⇤⇤
Wu-Hausman(p-value) < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤ < 2.2e   16⇤⇤⇤
Sargen(p-val.) 0.0007⇤⇤⇤ 0.0004⇤⇤⇤ 0.820
Observations 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839 553,839
R2 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.881 0.693 0.882 0.694 0.945 0.684
Note: The outcome variable is percent of Good AQI for columns 1 to 3, 4b, 5b, and 6b, while the outcome variable is the SP order in a county in a week for
columns 3a, 4a, and 5a. The explanatory variable is per capita COVID-19 case and death in models 2, 3, 5,and 6 and an extensive set of other COVID-19 policies
are include in models 3 and 6. All specifications include county, state by period fixed e↵ects. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at state level. ⇤p<0.1;
⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table C4: Alternative outcome variable clustered at state-level
Dependent variable:
AQI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shelter in Place (SPct)  0.380  58.138⇤⇤⇤  0.206  51.348
(0.600) (9.500) (0.469) (47.653)
Per Capita Case  33.780 208.850 449.880 574.664
(2,774.228) (2,474.162) (1,925.813) (2,091.117)
Per Capita Death  8,702.669⇤⇤⇤  7,321.090⇤⇤⇤  5,811.213⇤⇤⇤  5,698.768⇤⇤⇤
(1,726.549) (2,001.577) (1,780.056) (1,938.684)
Covid-19 Policies Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period by State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 553,816 553,816 21,400 21,400
R2 0.688 0.681 0.750 0.661
Note: The outcome variable is AQI for all models. All specifications include explanatory variables per
capita COVID-19 case and death and a full set of COVID-19 policies, and county and period by state
fixed e↵ects. Models 1 and 2 uses full set of data, whereas model 3 and 4 uses a subset of 2020 data.
Models in odd number are the OLS models while models in even numbers are the 2SLS models. Standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered at state level. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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